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INTRODUCTION

A. The Scope of this Analysis
It is not surprising that numerous interest groups are beginning
to cast covetous eyes on the enormous amount of capital accumulated
in private pension plans. Presently, private pension funds amount
to more than $279 billion.1 When public retirement systems are
included, the amount exceeds $500 billion.2 It is projected that
these totals will surpass $1.3 trillion by 1986 and will constitute
8
nearly half of the external capital raised by domestic corporations.
While this enormous pool of capital is being aggregated, questions have arisen concerning the financial stability of some of the
country's major public and private institutions, such as New York
City and the Chrysler Corporation. In each of these cases, use of
retirement-plan assets has been viewed as a possible remedy for the
institution in distress. 4 Other geographic areas or industries may
look to employee benefit funds as a source of capital for future
projects. These developments suggest that the question of what
* Many of the ideas in this Article were developed in a paper presented at a
forum of the Employee Benefits Research Institute in Washington, D.C. on
December 6, 1979.
f Partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Steptoe & Johnson. B.A. 1965,
Dickinson College; J.D. 1968, Villanova University. Member, District of Columbia

Bar and Pennsylvania Bar.
If Associate in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Steptoe & Johnson. B.A.
1973, Yale College; J.D. 1976, Harvard University. Member, District of Columbia
Bar.

I U.S. SECUTrrIES AND EXCHANGE CommisSION,
37, No. 5, at 8 (1978).

STATSTICAL Bru.nrL

, VOL.

2Id.

3 STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ANTrUST, MONOPOLY AND BusINEss BIGHTS
OF THE SENATE Comm. OF THE JUDICIAnY, 96TH CONG., 1ST SEss., B=EiNECrRy
PARTICIPATION IN PrvATE PENSION PLANS 1 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited
as STAFF REPoRT].

4 See Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of N.Y., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.
N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979) (rebuffing challenge to investment
of public-employee pension funds in New York bonds to ameliorate the City's fiscal

problems); note 14 infra & accompanying text (discussing Chrysler-UAW settlement).
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social purposes should be accomplished through the use of public
and private pension capital will continue to be important in the
years ahead.
This Article addresses a narrow, yet important, aspect of the
problem: the legal standards applicable to the investment of pension trust capital, particularly in the private sector 5 The Article
focuses on the capital collected in private retirement-plan trusts
presently subject to a federal regulatory scheme contained primarily
in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)6
the Internal Revenue Code, 7 and the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act.8 One unifying factor making such capital
pools more homogeneous than endowments and personal trusts is
that they already are subject to a federal legal standard with an
articulated social purpose-the adequate financing of retirement
benefits
The analysis concentrates on present legal standards, including
those that have received little scrutiny in the social-investing debate, in the hope that this will assist individuals studying the investment policies of pension plans in their evaluation of issues that
may arise in this setting. Others may profitably develop the social,
political, and economic arguments concerning what the law should
be in this area. 10
5 Public plans raise additional difficult issues, such as the varying standards of
care applicable to fiduciaries of these plans, the possibility of conflicts of interest
presented by public officials serving as fiduciaries, and constitutional protections for
government-employee pension interests. See generally Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of N.Y., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d
Cir. 1979); GmmmL AccouN-rmc Ormcn, FuNn in or STATE AND LocAL GovmNmENT PkNs oN PLANs: A NATIONAL PIOBLEM, HRD-79-66 (1979); Note, Public
Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HAsv. L. REv. 992 (1977).

An analysis of federal and state laws that affect the investment of assets held
by university endowment funds, private foundations, and personal trusts will be left
for another setting. See, e.g., UNFo~m MANAG mENT or INsTrruoNAL FUNDS
AcT (approved in 1972 and since adopted by 25 states). See generally Ravikoff
& Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the Prudent Man Rule,
68 CAIF. L. REv. 518 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Ravikoffi.
6 §§ 2-4082, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
7 I.R.C. §§ 401-415, 501-504.

8 §§ 1-303, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
9 See ERISA, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976); note 129 infra.
10The President's Commission on Pension Policy is presently studying this
issue. See Mares, The Use of Pension Fund Capital: Its Social and Economic
Implications-Some Background Issues 1 (Nov. 19, 1979) (working paper for
President's Commission on Pension Policy). Congress has also explored this issue
in recent hearings. See STArF REPORT, supra note 3. The Wisconsin Center for
Public Policy has also recently obtained a study on the impact of local investing
of plan assets. See Scott, Study Weighs "Social" Investment Risk, PEqsIONs &
ISYEsTmENTs, Oct. 8, 1979, at 3.
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The Article's analysis proceeds in three distinct phases. Following the introductory comments and definition of social investing, part II introduces the applicable law. Part III then analyzes
the impact on social investing of each of ERISA's separate fiduciary
rules." This analysis is followed by a discussion in part IV of the
prospects for litigation and the practical consequences of that environment for social investing. Part V both summarizes the conclusions of the article and applies its framework to two
social-investing problems frequently discussed in the literature.
B. The Genesis of the Issue
Much of the current debate on "social investment" of pension assets implies that this issue is of recent vintage. And there has
been a recent flurry of activity including the widely quoted work
of Messrs. Barber and Rifkin,12 legislation introduced in recent sessions of Congress, 13 and the pension investment provisions in the
"1Subsection A of part III sets out the basic structure of the ERISA fiduciary
rules. The first of those key standards is that fiduciaries are required to act
prudently. See ERISA, §404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(B) (1976);
29 C.F.R. § 2 5 5 0.404a-1 (1979); notes 74-98 infra & accompanying text. It is in
this setting that the fiduciary examines considerations of risk, return, liquidity, and
diversification to ensure that the proposed investment makes sound financial sense
for the plan. See notes 77-79 infra & accompanying text.
A second, distinct test emanates from common-law notions of loyalty that
require a trustee to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries rather than those
of himself or third parties. See notes 34-38 infra & accompanying text. Similarly,
ERISA §404(a)(1) instructs the fiduciary to act "solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries" of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (1976). See
44 Fed. Reg. 37,222 n.2 (1979); notes 99-147 infra & accompanying text.
ERISA's third set of standards-which will be considered in subsections D,
E, and F of part III-might be characterized as "structural" prohibitions because
they preclude certain investment policies independent of the investment's prudence
or fairness. These standards include prohibitions against transactions involving a
"party in interest," see ERISA, § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1976); notes 181-206
infra & accompanying text, regulation of transactions involving employer securities
or employer real property, see EBISA, § 407, 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (1976), and the
requirement that every transaction be executed "in accordance with the documents
and instruments governing the plan," ERISA, § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104
(a) (1) (D) (1976); see notes 157-80 infra & accompanying text.
12
j. Pax= & R. BAPBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AcGA: PENSIONS, PoLmcs

AiND PowEmiN m 1980's (1978).
'S E.g., Revenue Act of 1978, § 143, P.L. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2796 (codified
at I.R.C. § 401(a) (22)) (requiring pass through of voting rights in employer stock
where defined contribution plan owns more than 10% of employer stock not publicly
traded); S. 1745, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. BEc. 510, 385 (daily ed. June
22, 1977) (remarks of Sen. McIntyre) (size of business alone will not disqualify
investment under ERISA's prudence rule); S. 285, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG.
REc. 1457 (1977) (plan may invest up to two percent of assets in small businesses
without regard to prudent-man rule); H.R. 12666, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings
on H.R. 12666 Before the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978)
(modifying ERISA prudence rule to permit investment of up to five percent of plan
assets in small businesses).
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1979 Chrysler/U.A.W. contract settlement. 14 A recent study on the
investments of major public and private plans has also stimulated
discussion by identifying 99 "target companies" with allegedly deficient social performance. 15
This aura of novelty tends to obscure more than a decade of
debate on the problem in Congress. In 1967, for example, the
AFL-CIO Annual Convention adopted a "Policy Resolution on
Proposals for Federal Legislation to Regulate Health, Welfare,
Pension and Profit Sharing Plans" favoring the investment of
pension funds in "socially useful projects." 16 An AFL-CIO representative presented this position in congressional hearings on proposed federal fiduciary standards for private plans in December
1969.17 Again, in congressional hearings held in 1970, Walter Reuther of the U.A.W. made an eloquent plea for flexibility in the law
so that trustees could invest in "high social priority projects." 18
Similarly, in hearings in 1973, Ralph Nader advanced a complex
proposal which included a provision permitting investment of up
to ten percent of the assets of a pension fund in "special allowance
investments" designed to reduce the housing, medical, and consumer expenses of retirees. 19 Indeed, several early versions of pen14The agreement is reported to have created an investment advisory board
consisting of equal numbers of union and management members. -Up to 10% of
new contributions would be invested in residential mortgages in areas where UAW
members live, and in nursing homes, nursery schools, federally qualified health
maintenance organizations, and other socially desirable projects. In addition, the
union would have the right to recommend that pension trustees not invest in up
to five companies that conduct business in South Africa. See [1979] PENs. REP.
(BNA), Oct. 29, 1979 (No. 263), at A-28 to A-29. The Control Data Corporation
also has recently instructed its investment managers to consider social criteria in
investment decisions. Scott, Control Data Instructs Fund Managers To Use "Socially
Responsible" Criteria,PENsroNs & INVSTMENTs, Aug. 13, 1979, at 1.
15 ConvROaTE DATA EXCHANGE, INC., PENSION INVESTIEnrs: A SoCrL. AMrr
(1979). For a vigorous critique of the criteria used to measure social performance
in that study, see Schotland, Divergent Investment for Pension Funds, in Ei LoE
BENFTs REsEARCH INsTrrTrT, SHOULD PENsioN AssETs BE MANAGED FOR SoCAL/
PorrrcAL PurPosns? 105, 149-59 (D. Salisbury ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
EBRI]. We do not here attempt to resolve this controversy over what conduct is
"socially responsible" or how the degree of social responsibility practiced by a
company should be measured.
16Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1045, H.R.
1046, and H.R. 16462 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 102-04 (1969-1970) (statement
of Andrew J. Biemiller) [hereinafter cited as Private Welfare Hearings].
17 Id.

104-12.

18 Id. 186 (statement of Walter Reuther); see id. 194, 197.
19 Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462
Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 1) 260, 271-72, 292-93 (1973) (statement of
Ralph Nader and Karen Ferguson) [hereinafter cited as Pension Plan Hearings].
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sion reform legislation authorized plan provisions permitting
2
socially desirable investments without regard to prudence.
The final language of ERISA's fiduciary rules, discussed below, 2' was shaped in the context of this early activity. Thus, the
courts will not be writing on a clean slate when they undertake to
resolve questions concerning the permissibility of socially desirable
investments. 22 It seems likely that the judiciary will act upon the
premise that the legislature has considered this issue and provided
an answer in ERISA's fiduciary standards.
C. Defining "Social Investing"
The issue of social investing has proven elusive of analysis, in
part because of its protean character. Depending on the context,
social investing may take different, sometimes philosophically inconsistent, forms. A policy of social investment may be designed
to benefit the participants incidentally by improving the community in which they live, or it may be designed to ameliorate,
some regional, national, or even international problem. A socialinvestment program may involve a selfless sacrifice of the participants' interests in order to aid some other, less fortunate
segment of society, or it may be part of a calculated strategy to
enhance the political and economic strength of the participants.
The techniques for implementing a policy of social investing
may also vary widely: from a policy of excluding future investments in particular companies, to the affirmative selection of certain preferred investments, to the divestiture of undesirable investments. In each of these situations, moreover, the relative weight
given to economic and social factors may be different: social considerations may dictate investment policy, or they may be invoked
only as a guide when all other characteristics are comparable.
Most of the diverse practices discussed in the context of "social
investing" can be classified within one of three basic categories:
(1) totally neutral investment policies; (2) socially sensitive investment policies; or (3) socially dictated investment policies.
"Totally neutral investment policies" focus solely on the financial aspects of investment alternatives. Fiduciaries would
analyze the traditional investment considerations, such as the plan
characteristics (design, funding, etc.), risk/return considerations,
20

E.g., H.R. 16462, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CoNe. REO:.7453 (1970).

21 See part III infra.
22

For a more complete discussion of the legislative history of this aspect of
ERISA, see notes 131-41 infra & accompanying text.
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liquidity, and diversification. 23 Within this frame of reference, it
may be that labor-relations practices, compliance with environmental or safety standards, or other policies could affect the financial stability and profitability of a company whose securities are
being analyzed. If the fiduciary performing the financial analysis
of the investment activity has a sound empirical basis for considering these factors, then their use is defensible on purely financial grounds.2 4 The fiduciary does not override basic financial
investment considerations for the sake of a social objective, nor
does he temper judgments on comparable alternatives by focusing
on noninvestment factors. The question of "social investing" never
arises in this setting, and we need not confuse the legal analysis
applicable to "social investing" by belaboring such practices.
"Socially sensitive investment policies" include those investment practices in which the investing fiduciary analyzes traditional
investment considerations such as plan characteristics, risk/return
factors, liquidity, and diversification. Once this analysis is completed, however, the fiduciary then selects among financially comparable investment alternatives by considering other factors. As
the following analysis suggests, so long as the fiduciary has not
decided to sacrifice comparability of safety, return, diversification,
or marketability in order to employ noninvestment considerations,
he has discharged his responsibility under the "prudence"
25
standard.
There remains the question, however, whether the investment
is being undertaken "solely in the interest" of plan participants
and beneficiaries.28 It is at this point that certain "socially sensitive" investment policies that consider nonfinancial factors may
pass legal muster, while others may not. A review of the legislative history of ERISA, in addition to recent legislative and judicial
activity, suggests that certain policies that are intended to serve
the interests of plan participants, in their capacity as participants,
may be employed. On the other hand, policies that cannot
be related in some plausible fashion to the primary interests of
23

See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1979).
recent Senate staff report concluded:
In cases where social factors affect a company's profitability prospects,
such criteria may be considered in the profitability analysis itself. Profitability may be adversely affected by such factors as instability of a company's labor relations and an unstable political situation in the country in
which an investment is located or with which the company does business.
Sr.Ar Rupowr, supra note 3, at 1-2.
25
See text following note 98 infra.
26
See notes 99-147 infra & accompanying text.
24 A
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plan participant, but instead serve the interests of the employer,
union, or third parties, may well violate this standard of loyalty or
the more specific rules that prohibit dealings with parties directly
27
or indirectly related to the plan.
"Socially dictated investment policies" are those investment
practices and policies which either (1) permit the sacrifice of safety,
return, diversification, or marketability; or (2) are undertaken to
serve some objective that cannot be related to the interests of
plan participants and beneficiaries in their capacity as such. When
a plan fiduciary sacrifices traditional investment quality, he faces
the substantial risk of violating the prudence standard. 28 Likewise, if a fiduciary acts to further his own interests or those of
29
third parties, he will be in violation of the loyalty standard.
Given the present state of the law governing the investment of
plan assets, plan fiduciaries would be ill-advised to direct or permit
either kind of activity.

II.

APPLICABLE LAW

A. Pre-ERISA Sources of Law
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, there were three principal
sources of law governing investment decisions of a fiduciary managing an employee benefit plan: trust law, the Internal Revenue
Code, and the Taft-Hartley Act.
All plans employing the trust device were governed by statelaw fiduciary principles generally applicable to trusts. The most
familiar of these was the prudent-man rule: in the absence of a
contrary direction in the trust, the trustee is under a duty to "make
such investments and only such investments as a prudent man
would make of his own property having in view the preservation
of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be
derived." 30 While an assurance of "reasonable" income is one permissible objective under the common law,31 most courts applying
27 See notes 99-156 & notes 181-206 infra & accompanying text.
28

See, e.g., note 94 infra & accompanying text.

29

See notes 99-156 & notes 181-206 infra & accompanying text.
See generally G.G.
80sREsTATEmENrr (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRusTEns § 612, at 407-11
(2d ed. 1960 & Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BomaT]; Fleming, Prudent
Investments: The Varying Standards of Prudence, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & Tn. J.
243 (1977). A few states still limit the percentage of assets that may be invested
under the prudent-man rule and prescribe a "legal list" of permissible invest-

ments. Id. 410 & n.20 (2d ed. 1960).
3

1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TRUSTS §

227, Comment e (1959).
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the common-law rule take the possibility of capital loss as the principal measure of the riskiness of an investment, 32 and tend to focus
on the prudence of the individual investment rather than on the
wisdom of the investment within the context of the entire
33
portfolio.
The common law also imposed on the fiduciary of an employee
benefit trust a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries.3 4 In order
to prevent a conflict of interest, the fiduciary was prohibited from
entering into transactions with the trust 35 or from competing with
the trust res.36 In addition to such specific proscriptions of selfdealing and conflict of interest, the trustee was "enjoined to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary." 87 The
terms of the trust, however, could sometimes authorize the fiduciary
to do what would otherwise be a breach of his duty of loyalty to the
beneficiaries. 3
Second, certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code reinforce common-law trust principles. In order to qualify for taxexempt status under the Code, 39 the employer's plan must be
maintained "for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their
beneficiaries," 40 and the trust instrument must make it "impos32
See Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment [sic] Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Hauv. L. REv. 960,
966-67 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fiduciary Standards]; Note, The Regulation
of Risky Investments, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 603, 616-17 (1970).
33
See, e.g., Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of N.Y., 447 F. Supp. 1248,
1254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); Bank of N.Y. v.
Spitzer, 35 N.Y.2d 512, 517, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164, 168 (1974);
McKechnie v. Springfield, 311 Mass. 406, 414, 41 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRuSTS § 213 (1959).
34
See 2 A. ScoTr, Tnm LAw OF TRUSTS § 170 (3d ed. 1967) thereinafter cited
as ScoTr ON TRusTs].
35
B ESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170, Comments b, c, & h (1959).
36 Id.Comment p.
37 Id. § 170. Although the common-law duty of loyalty clearly precludes the
trustee from taking any action for his own benefit, there is increasing support from
commentators (but not the courts) for the view that an institutional trustee may
follow an investment policy that benefits the community as a whole as well as the
specific beneficiaries. See 3 Scor ON TnuSTS, supra note 34, at § 227.17 (Supp.
1980).
382 ScoTT ON TnusTs, supra note 34, at § 170.9 (3d ed. 1967). On grounds
of public policy, some state statutes refuse to permit the terms of the trust to legalize
more dangerous acts of disloyalty. See BOGERT, supra note 30, at § 543(u), at
377-78 (rev. 2d ed. 1978).
39
When a plan has qualified for such status, the employer may immediately
deduct his contributions as ordinary and necessary business expenses, I.R.C. § 404(a),
the plan need not ordinarily pay tax on its investment income, id. § 501(a), and
the participant may defer payment of tax until the receipt of benefits. Id.
§§402(a)(1), 403(a)(1).
40Id. § 401(a).
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sible... for any part of the corpus or income to be ... used for,
or diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of his
employees or their beneficiaries." 41
Although the exclusive-benefit rule of the Internal Revenue
Code obviously applies to the investment of plan assets, historically
it has not been a stringent constraint. 42 The Internal Revenue
Service and the courts have been understandably reluctant to enforce the rule strictly by disqualifying plans and thereby depriving
employees of the tax benefits to which they would otherwise be
entitled.4 3 The Internal Revenue Service has interpreted the
exclusive-benefit rule to permit some collateral benefit to other persons, so long as the investments have the primary purpose of benefiting employees or their beneficiaries. 44 Courts have agreed that
incidental benefit to a third party is not sufficient to justify dis4
qualification of a plan.

5

A third, pre-ERISA source of legal control on the operations
of employee benefit plans was section 802 (c) (5) of the Taft-Hartley
411d. § 401(a)(2). A plan will be considered not to be for the exclusive
benefit of employees if it is a subterfuge for the distribution of profits to shareholders or if it discriminates in favor of officers, shareholders, or highly compensated
employees. Id. §401(a)(4); 26 C.F.R. §1.401-1(b)(3) (1979).
In certain
circumstances, however, it may be possible for a plan to return to an employer excess
contributions based on a mistake of fact, see ERISA, § 403(c) (2) (A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c)(2)(A) (1976), or the residual assets of the plan after all obligations
have been paid upon termination, see ERISA, § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1)
(1976), without violating the strictures of I.R.C. § 401(a) (2).
42 The implementing regulations authorize the purchase of any investment permitted by the trust agreement to the extent allowed by local law. 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.401-1(b)(5)(i) (1979).
43
Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237, 238 (9th Cir. 1958); S. EP.
No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 18 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4890, 4892, 4903, also reprinted in 1 SUBco~Mv. ON LABOR OF
m SENATE Commi.
ON LABOR AND Putric WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., LEcIsLA.rIVE H STORY OF Tm EMPLOYEE R ETIRExMENT INCOiME SECUrMTY ACT OF 1974,

at 1063, 1071-72, 1086 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as ERISA LEc.
I-Isr.]; Herbert, Investment Regulation and Conflicts of Interest in EmployerManaged Pension Plans, 17 B.C. INnus. & CoM. L. REv. 127, 140-41 (1976).
44
E.g., Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88. The Service has taken the position
that other parties-including the employer-may benefit from plan investments so
long as four investment requisites are met:
These requisites are: (1) the cost must not exceed fair market value at time
of purchase; (2) a fair return commensurate with the prevailing rate
must be provided; (3) sufficient liquidity must be maintained to permit distributions in accordance with the terms of the plan; and (4) the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor would adhere to must be
present.
Id. Although this administrative interpretation of the statute is entitled to some
deference, see Central Motor Co. v. United States, 583 F.2d 470, 490 (10th Cir.
1978), it has never been explicitly sustained by the courts. See Shelby U.S. Distribs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 874 (1979).
45 See Shelby U.S. Distribs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 874, 885 (1979);
Feroleto Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 97, 113 (1977).
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Act,48 which applies only to plans established jointly by a union and
one or more employers. This provision permits employer contributions to the trust fund only if the trust meets certain conditions
designed to prevent diversion of the funds by union officers to
themselves or to the union.47 The Act also requires that the trust
fund be established "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the em48
ployees of such employer, and their families and dependents."
Most federal courts have interpreted section 302 to govern only
the structure of covered plans and not also to grant jurisdiction to
the federal courts to adjudicate individual violations of fiduciary
standards. 49 Nevertheless, the courts have found the "sole and exclusive benefit" rule a sufficient basis for invalidating those general
rules or practices of trust administration that appeared designed
to benefit persons other than the employees. 50 For example, allegations that a break-in-service provision of a pension plan was intended primarily to benefit the union have been held to state a
claim under section 302(c) (5). 51 Although section 302 (c) (5) retains some vitality as a means to challenge certain practices of
jointly administered trusts,52 its utility has been overshadowed by
the more pervasive provisions of ERISA.5 3
B. ERISA

Congressional enactment of ERISA followed nearly a decade of
review of the existing legal framework for the regulation of em4829 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1976).
47
For example, there must be a written agreement detailing the basis on which
payments are to be made, and the fund must be jointly administered by equal
numbers of employer and union representatives. Taft-Hartley Act, § 302(c) (5) (B),
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976). The Act permits the mutually agreeable addition of neutral persons. Id.
41 Id., §302(c)(5)(A), 29 U.S.C. §186(c)(5)(A) (1976).
49
E.g., Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (2d Cir. 1975); Snider v.
All State Adm'rs, Inc., 481 F.2d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
957 (1974); Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 424-26 (1st Cir. 1968).
50
E.g., Souza v. Scalone, 64 F.R.D. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 563 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1977); Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of
the Illumination Prods. Indus., 366 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Insley v. Joyce,
330 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Il. 1971).
51 E.g., Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ill. 1971). Even under this
provision, however, an indirect or incidental benefit to the union or the employer
would probably not be prohibited by the statute. See Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of the Illumination Prods. Indus., 388 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (E.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 529 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976); Culinary
Workers and Bartenders Local 596 Health and Welfare Trust v. Gateway Cafe,
91 Wash. 2d 353, -, 588 P.2d 1334, 1340 (1979).
52 ERISA, § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1976) (saving all federal laws from
preemption).
53
See Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 1979).
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ployee benefit plans. ERISA preempts-as of January 1, 1975all state laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan" covered by the statute, 54 thus precluding
the application of state fiduciary principles to investment decisions made after that date.5 5 Although the Internal Revenue Code
requirements remain in effect, the conference report to ERISA
states that a fiduciary satisfying the ERISA standards for investment will be deemed to be in compliance with those aspects of the
exclusive-benefit requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.5 6
Similarly, it appears that satisfaction of the more specific ERISA
standards would satisfy the "exclusive benefit of the employees" rule
57
of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Thus, questions whether various forms of social investing are
permissible for private-sector employee benefit plans must be determined by reference to the fiduciary standards of ERISA.58 Prior
decisional law remains relevant, however, because Congress, in
fashioning ERISA, drew language and principles from the earlier
bodies of law. 59 Proper interpretations of the statute will draw on
points of both similarity and difference between traditional fiduciary
standards and ERISA's provisions.
In the hearings preceding ERISA's passage, Congress studied
the investment practices of employee benefit plans under the existing legal framework. The hearings exposed many abuses, including
54ERISA, 9514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
55 See Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 558 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1977). For
a more comprehensive discussion of the preemptive effect of ERISA, see generally
Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 23 (1978); Turza & Halloway,
Preemption of State Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 28 CATm. U. L. REv. 163 (1979).
56 H.R. EPa. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 [hereinafter cited as CONFEmENCE REroRT], reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5083,
also reprinted in 3 ERISA LEc. HIsT., supra note 43, at 4277, 4569.
57
Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 528 (3d Cir. 1979).
58ERISA does not cover plans maintained by state or local governments. See
Feinstein v. Lewis, 477 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); ERISA, § 3(32),
4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. 091002(32); 1003(b)(1) (1976). In 1978, Representatives
Dent and Erlenborn, the chairman and ranking minority member of the House
Labor Standards Subcommittee, introduced a proposed Public Employee Retirement Income Security Act (PERISA), H.R. 14138, 95th Cong., 2d Sss., 124 CONG.
REc. H10, 264 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978). This bill would have subjected fiduciaries for public plans to the same standards of fiduciary responsibility as apply to
private plans under ERISA §404(a)(1), as well as adding certain prohibited
transactions. See [1978] PENs. REP,. (BNA), Sept. 25, 1978 (No. 207), at A-15,
R-19. Although this legislation was not enacted by the 95th Congress, there is
continuing pressure to enact legislation protecting the interests of participants in
public plans. See H.R. 6525, 96th Cong., 2d Sss., reported in [1980] PENs. REP.
(BNA), Feb. 2, 1980 (No. 278), at A-12.
59 See notes 30-53 supra &accompanying text.
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excessive investments in employer stock, absence of diversification,
and use of plan assets for the benefit of plan fiduciaries.6 0 The congressional committees concluded that the common-law emphasis on
the intent of the grantor, which permitted deviations from sound
0
investment practices, was inappropriate for employee benefit plans. '

The legislative history also pointed out the inadequacies of the
existing legal procedures as means to control abuses and the need
for a uniform fiduciary standard in the interstate context.62
These perceptions led directly to ERISA's new federal fiduciary
standards and a concomitant system of enforcement. Under the
statutory scheme, every plan must provide for one or more "named
fiduciaries" having authority to control and manage the plan. 63
Trustees named in the trust instrument, or appointed by a named
fiduciary, have exclusive authority and discretion to manage plan
assets, 4 unless the plan expressly provides that the trustee will be
subject to the direction of a named fiduciary 5 or that investment
authority will be delegated to an investment manager. 6
All persons exercising discretionary authority or control with
respect to the management of the plan or its assets fall within the
Act's broad definition of "fiduciary." 67 The definition specifically
embraces the plan's trustee, any investment managers to whom investment authority may have been delegated, and persons supplying
60

See Private Welfare Hearings, supra note 16, at 470-72 (app. to testimony
of George Shultz).
6
'H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as 1973 H.R. REP.], reprinted in [1974] U.S. ConE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4650,
also reprinted in 2 ERISA LEG. His., supra note 43, at 2348, 2359; S. REP.
No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 S. REP.],
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4838, 4865, also reprinted in
1 ERISA LEG. HIST., supra note 43, at 587, 615.
62
See sources cited in note 61 supra.
63 ERISA,§ 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1976).
64 Id., § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976).

Or, Id., § 403(a) (1), 2.9 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1) (1976).
661d., §§402(c)(3), 403(a)(2.), 2.9 U.S.C. §§1102(c)(3),

1103(a)(2.)

(1976). See also id., § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (1976) (definition of "investment manager").
67ERISA, §3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1976) provides in relevant
part:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility
to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
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investment advice for compensation. 68 Thus, any person who directs the investment of plan assets-whether for social or financial
purposes-is a fiduciary for purposes of ERISA.
An ERISA fiduciary is subject to both the general fiduciary
standards of section 404 69 and the specific "prohibited transaction"
provisions of section 406.70 In addition, a fiduciary may be held
liable for a knowing failure to prevent or remedy a breach of trust
by a cofiduciary. 71 Thus, although a trust may delegate responsibility for investment decisions to a qualified investment manager,
a trustee with knowledge of a violation of the statute's fiduciary
standards on the part of the manager may be held liable for failure
to take appropriate action. In sum, ERISA casts a broad regulatory
net over everyone with any responsibility for the management of
the plan and may entangle them-like it or not-in the issue of
social investing.

III. ANALYSIS

OF SOCIAL INVESTING UNDER

ERISA

A. Structure of ERISA Section 404(a)
The central provision regulating the investment activities of
fiduciaries under ERISA is section 404 (a) of the statute.7 2 Two
68Under the applicable regulations, a recommendation to purchase or sell a
security is investment advice if the individual rendering it has discretion to make
investment decisions or if he renders advice specialized for the plan with the understanding that his advice will be relied upon as a primary source of guidance in
making investment decisions. 26 C.F.R. §54.4975-9(c)(1) (1979); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510.3-21(c)(1) (1979).
69 ERISA, § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976).
70Id., § 406, U.S.C. § 1106 (1976). The limitations imposed by this section
are more fully discussed at notes 181-206 infra & accompanying text.
71ERISA, § 405, 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, FR-10
(1979).
72Subject to sections 403(c) and (d), 4042, and 4044, a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk
of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent
not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter.
ERISA, § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1) (1976).
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features of this provision should be noted at the outset. First, its
standards apply to all of the dudes for which a fiduciary is responsible under the plan. Thus, the prudence requirement constrains
not only the selection of investments, but also the selection of an
investment manager or advisor, the formulation of investment
guidelines, the voting of shares held by the plan, and the ongoing
monitoring of the plan's investment activity. These standards also
apply to decisions that do not concern investments, such as operating policies. Indeed, the fiduciary standards of section 404 (a)(1)
even have application to conduct recommending, designing, or
implementing amendments to the plan's structure53 Second, fiduciary standards established by this provision are in the conjunctive; each must be satisfied by a proposed course of action. Thus,
a prudent investment that violates the "solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries" standard of section 404(a) (1) does
not comply with the statute. Similarly, activity that is prudent
and solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries is
impermissible if it is not also exclusively for the purpose of providing benefits and defraying the reasonable expenses of the plan
as required by section 404 (a)(1) (A) or has been undertaken in violation of plan documents, as proscribed by section 404(a) (1) (D).
Because the fiduciary standards imposed by this provision are distinct, they are examined separately below.
B. Social Investing Under the Federal Prudence and
Diversification Rules
1.Prudence
Much of the current debate on the propriety of social investing
has focused on whether the prudence rule permits such investments.
The prudence rule contained in section 404(a) (1)(B) provides no
direct answer to this question. Whether a particular social investment is permissible under this section depends not only on the
nature of the investment, but also on the needs of the plan and the
characteristics of the remainder of the plan's portfolio.
Although section 404 (a) (1) (B) is rooted in the prevailing
common-law rule,7 4 the federal rule for covered employee benefit
plans differs in several important respects.7
Under the federal
73
See Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978); Winpistnger v. Aurora
Corp. of IlL, 456 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
74
See notes 30--33 supra& accompanying text
75 The preamble to the Department of Labor regulation explicating this subsection states that "[t]he 'prudence' rule in the Act sets forth a standard built upon,
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provision, the conduct of a fiduciary must be compared with that of
other fiduciaries "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters

. . .

in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and

with like aims." 76 The legislative history makes clear that the
purpose of this language was to fashion a flexible standard of prudence acknowledging the special purposes of employee benefit plans
and the vast diversity among them. 77
Federal regulations require the plan fiduciary to consider the
funding objectives and cash-flow requirements of the plan in evaluat78
ing the rate of return and liquidity of a proposed investment.
In general, an ERISA investment program must be designed with
due regard for such varying plan characteristics as the nature and
size of the plan, its tolerance for risk, funding status, liquidity
needs, and contribution rates.7 9 Thus, the prudence of a proposed
form of social investing cannot be evaluated in the abstract. The
particular investment must be judged in light of the complete
factual setting, including the plan's needs and characteristics.
The basic structure of the plan would be one relevant consideration in determining the propriety of a particular social investment. For example, in a defined benefit plan, the sponsoring
employer or employers are responsible for making contributions adebut that should and does depart from, traditional trust law in certain respects."
44 Fed. Reg. 37,222 (1979). Accord, Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension
Trust Fund, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
76 ERISA, § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1976).
77 In hearings in 1970, Secretary of Labor George Shultz characterized similar
language in H.R. 16462 as providing a standard with "a built in flexibility . . .
which recognizes the vast diversity and other characteristics of private pension and
welfare plans." Private Welfare Hearings, supra note 16, at 477 (statement of
George Shultz). See generally Report, ERISA and the Investment Management
and Brokerage Industries: Five Years Later, 35 Bus. LAw. 189, 238 & n.35 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as ERISA Report]. The American Bankers Association favored
this language because it would give the trustees of employee benefit funds "sufficient
latitude to invest the funds to the best advantage in current and future markets."
Private Welfare Hearings, supra note 16, at 799 (statement of William F. Lackman).
78 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b) (2) (1979).
The federal prudence standard also
permits variations in the quality of investment-management expertise. The manager
of a plan with assets of $50,000 need not resort to the same investment techniques
as would a fiduciary of a plan with assets of $50,000,000. See 44 Fed. Reg. 37,224
(1979). On the other band, the sliding scale used by the Labor Department suggests that a plan with sufficient funds to defray the expense of professional investment advice must be able to justify the prudence of its investments--including its
social investments-with relatively sophisticated financial analysis. Id.
7929 C.F.R. §2550.404a-1(b)(2) (1979).
See Private Welfare Hearings,
supra note 16, at 477 (statement of George Shultz), 521 (statement of Lawrence
Silberman). For a discussion of the ERISA prudence standard, see generally
Hutchinson, The Federal Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA, 22 ViLL. L. REv. 15
(1976); Klevan, Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERiSA's Prudent Man Rule: What
Are the Guideposts?, 44 J. TAx. 152 (1976); ERISA Report, supra note 77, at 23742; Fiduciary Standards, supra note 32.
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quate to provide a specified level of benefits to the participants.0
The sponsor thus bears the primary risk of capital loss or inadequate
income to cover the plan's current obligations. In this situation,
it would be less likely that a participant would challenge the conduct of a trustee or investment manager who, with the concurrence
of the sponsors, followed a socially sensitive investment policy.
Similarly, a socially dictated policy, though resulting in a technical
violation of ERISA, would be less likely to provoke a challenge so
long as the employer maintained the specified level of benefits.
On the other hand, in a defined-contribution plan the funding
obligation of the employer is limited to the amount specified in the
plan documents, and the employees bear the direct investment
risks. A socially dictated investment policy would not only be much
harder to justify in this context, but also would be more likely to
provoke litigation as participant benefits were lost.81
The nature of the plan is not the sole factor to be considered.
Even in a defined benefit plan, the employer may not be able to
meet its funding obligations. If the plan has a large unfunded liability, and the employer is not in good financial health, it might
be imprudent to invest in socially desirable projects carrying a relatively high risk of loss. On the other hand, socially sensitive investing by a defined contribution plan may not be imprudent if a
thorough analysis of the plan's portfolio demonstrates that the risk
and return associated with the investment complement the remainder of the plan's portfolio in meeting the plan's investment
objectives.
In this regard, a second important change wrought by ERISA
in the prudence rule was a shift to a whole portfolio approach.
Under the common law, the trustee could not defend his actions by
showing that losses with respect to a particular investment were offset by gains on other investments or investment income.8s The
common-law approach arose in part from the need in trust administration to resolve a basic conflict between the interests of income
beneficiaries and remaindermen. This conflict does not arise in the
same form, if indeed it arises at all, in the context of employee
88
benefit plans.
Recognizing the congressional directive to interpret the common law of trusts "bearing in mind the special nature and purpose
80 See International Bhc. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 554 n.3 (1979);

§ 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1976).
ERISA,
81

See notes 211 & 212 infra & accompanying text.
See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
83 See 43 Fed. Reg. 17,481 (1978); Fiduciary Standards, supra note 32, at 967.
82
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of employee benefit plans," 84 the Department of Labor has issued
regulations rejecting the compartmentalized common-law approach
Under the regulato analysis of the prudence of an investment.
tions, the relative riskiness of an investment, standing alone, does
not make the investment per se prudent or per se imprudent.
Rather, the fiduciary must analyze the role that the investment
plays within the entire portfolio. 86 The fiduciary will be considered by the Department of Labor to be in compliance when he
considers not only the possibility of capital gain or loss and probable investment income,8 7 but also such criteria as diversification,
liquidity, current return relative to anticipated cash-flow requirements, and projected portfolio return relative to the plan's funding
objectives.8 8 Generally stated, he must determine whether the individual investment or projected course of action is reasonably
designed, as part of the portfolio, to further the overall purposes of
the plan.89
This flexible interpretation of the prudent-man rule permits a
larger universe of investments under the prudence rule of ERISA
than under the common law.90 For example, the preamble to the
Labor Department regulations states that investment in securities
issued by a small or new company, which could be riskier than
those of a "blue chip" company, may be entirely proper under the
Act. 91 The Department also has recognized the possibility that
investments not producing current income-such as precious metal,
objects of art, particular types of real estate investments, or certain92
stock option strategies-might play a legitimate role in a portfolio.
This rationale would suggest that in appropriate circumstances
other "nontraditional" investments, such as certain types of yen84 CONFmEE

CONG.

REPORT, supra note 56, at 302, reprinted in

[1974] U.S.

CODE

& AD. NEws 5038, 5083, also reprinted in 3 ERISA LEG. HIs'., supra note

43, at 4277, 4569.
85 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-I (1979).
86 44 Fed. Reg. 37,224-25 (1979). Safe harbor is provided to the fiduciary
who gives "appropriate consideration" to the relevant facts and circumstances,
including the role that an investment or investment course of action plays in the
plan's portfolio. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (b) (1) (1979).
87 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-(b)(2) (1979).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See 44 Fed. Reg. 37,225 (1979) (Department commentary).
91 Id. 37,222. Under the common law, the trustee must steer clear of investments in "new or untried" enterprises. See 3 ScoTr oN TRuSTS, supra note 34, at
1816.
92 44 Fed. Reg. 37,224-25 (1979).
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ture capital or commodity futures investments, also might be
permissible 3
Although the regulations do not refer in any way to the possibility of social investing, the "whole portfolio" approach adopted
by the regulations may make it somewhat easier to defend the prudence of an investment undertaken in consideration of nonfinancial
factors. For example, even though an investment in a pool of local
mortgages may yield a lower rate of return than a projected return
on corporate equities, the mortgage investment may be designed to
help stabilize performance and provide diversification within a portfolio already holding large concentrations of equity securities.
Similarly, investment in a new local business as part of an effort to
revitalize a downtown area may not be imprudent given the size
of the plan's portfolio, the riskiness of the other investments, the
liquidity and income needs of the plan, and a determination that
the local investment will play an appropriate part in meeting the
plan's investment objectives.
The regulation, however, is not intended to create pools of
unrestricted "mad money" that can be invested in any vehicle
striking the fancy of the fiduciary with investment control. A fiduciary cannot ignore his obligation to evaluate a particular investment to ensure its consistency with plan characteristics and
objectives merely because a favorable return on the total portfolio
is assured by high returns on other plan investments. The preamble to the Labor Department regulations emphasizes that "a
particular plan investment should [not] be deemed to be prudent
solely by reason of the propriety of the aggregate risk/return characteristics of the plan's portfolio" and that "appropriate consideration of an investment to further the purposes of the plan must
include consideration of the characteristics of the investment
itself." 94
2. Diversification
Analysis of the role played by an investment within the plan's
portfolio necessarily includes consideration whether the plan is adequately diversified. ERISA section 404(a)(l)(c) emphasizes this factor by specifically stating that a fiduciary must discharge his
responsibility to the participants and beneficiaries "by diversifying
93

See Address by Ian Lanoff, Administrator, Dep't of Labor Pension and
Welfare Benefit Programs, Eighth Annual Pension Conference held by Institutional
Investor (Jan. 10-11, 1980) (reported in [1980] PEas. RP. (BNA), Jan. 14, 1980
(No. 273), at A-13 to A-14).

94 44 Fed. Reg. 37,224 (1979).
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the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to
do so." 95 Although there is no fixed limit on the degree of investment concentration, the conference report lists a number of relevant facts and circumstances: "(I) the purposes of the plan; (2) the
amount of the plan assets; (3)financial and industrial conditions;
(4) the type of investment, whether mortgages, bonds or shares of
stock or otherwise; (5) distribution as to geographical location; (6)
distribution as to industries; (7) the dates of maturity." 96
The statute's policy of diversification might well make it easier
to invest a small percentage of the plan's assets in socially desirable
investments whose characteristics differ from the other investments
in the portfolio, but the diversification rule places an important
limit on the breadth of any specific program of social investing.
The conference report states unequivocally that a fiduciary could
not, for example, decide to devote all or even a substantial part of
the plan assets to local investments: "the fiduciary should not invest
the whole or an unduly large proportion of the trust property in...
various types of securities dependent upon . . .conditions in one

locality, since the effect is to increase the risk of large losses." 97
A similar limitation applies to mortgage investments. 98 Thus, even
a socially desirable investment that is financially sound in terms of
risk, return, and liquidity may not be permissible under ERISA
because of the diversification rule of the statute.
In summary, the federal prudence and diversification rules
neither absolutely preclude nor specifically authorize the selection
of investments that may be partially motivated by nonfinancial
considerations. ERISA requires the fiduciary to undertake an
analysis of the suitability of the individual investment. The analysis should compare the risks and return associated with the investment to the needs of the plan and the characteristics of the
remainder of the plan's portfolio; one also should consider the
availability of alternative investments that could serve the plan's
needs at least as well.
This analysis may well produce a range of investment alternatives that are truly comparable in terms of serving the plan's articu9529 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1976).
96

CONEBENE REPoRT, supra note 56, at 304, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5084-85, also reprinted in 3 ERISA LEG. IST., supra
note 43, at 4277, 4571.
97Id.
98

"[The fiduciary] should not invest a disproportionate amount. . . in mortgages in a particular district or on a particular class of property so that a decline
in property values in that district or of that class might cause a large loss." Id.
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lated investment objectives, thereby giving the fiduciary some
latitude in considering nonfinancial characteristics of the investment alternatives. But, even if the plan's investment objectives
have not been compromised to produce collateral "social" results,
the fiduciary must still consider the other standards that govern
his conduct.
C. Social Investing Under the "Solely in the Interest of the
Participantsand Beneficiaries" Rule
An investment program satisfying the threshold financial requirements of the prudence rule contained in section 404 (a) (1) (B)
also must be undertaken "solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries" as required by ERISA section 404 (a) (1).99 The
"solely in the interest" test is an extension of the common-law
principle imposing on a trustee an undivided duty of loyalty to the
beneficiaries in the administration of a trust. 100 As with the
common-law duty of loyalty, this obligation applies to all responsibilities of the fiduciary and is of "fundamental" importance. 101 It
stands at the head of ERISA's section on fiduciary responsibility,
and is complemented by the specific admonitions in section 404
and the detailed proscription of self-dealing contained in sections
406 and 407.102 Because of the importance of this principle to the
scheme of the statute, and because this language directly addresses
the problem of the purpose of plan investments, any proposed social investment must be scrutinized closely under this rule.
1. The "Solely in the Interest" Requirement as a
Proscription of Self-Dealing
Although the guiding principle of ERISA section 404(a)(1)
springs from the common law, its language appears to have been
drawn from the Internal Revenue Code and the Taft-Hartley
Act.1 03 The case law interpreting these statutes suggests that,
despite the rigidity of terms such as "sole" and "exclusive," an in9929 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1975). The preamble to the final prudence regulation explains that a reference to the "solely in the interest" language of § 404(a)(1)
was deleted from the final regulation "to avoid suggesting that satisfaction of the
'prudence' rule with respect to an investment or investment course of action necessarily implies satisfaction of that additional requirement." 44 Fed. Reg. 37,222 n.2
(1979). This delineation between the separate and distinct concepts of prudence
and loyalty is embedded in the structure of the Act and the common law.
100 See notes 34-38 supra & accompanying text.
10 1 See 2 ScoTr ON TausTs, supra note 34, at 1297.
102 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (1976).
10 3
See notes 39-53 supra & accompanying text.
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vestment resulting in an incidental benefit to a third party does
not necessarily violate the statute. 104 The crucial question is
whether the primary purpose of the investment is to benefit the
participants or beneficiaries of the trust. 10 5 Purpose is not to be
evaluated, however, solely on the basis of declarations of subjective
intent by the fiduciary; an inference may be drawn from the practical effects of the fiduciary's actions. 106
At a minimum, the "solely in the interest" test of section
404(a)(1) would proscribe any form of social investing with the
primary purpose of benefiting any party responsible for the management or administration of the trust. Thus, an employer whose
social-investing plan consists of a program of local investments
designed to strengthen the financial viability of his customers or
commercial lenders is not acting "solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries." Similarly, it has been held to be a
violation of ERISA's duty of loyalty for a plan to purchase employer
securities or employer debt obligations without considering the
paramount interests of the participants and beneficiaries. 10 Although such programs might provide incidental benefits to the participants both as employees and as local residents, the employer may
find it difficult to demonstrate that its interests were not given
paramount consideration. 08
Similarly, the "solely in the interest" test would proscribe any
social investment whose primary purpose is to benefit the employees' union, even though the employees may benefit indirectly as
well. This application of the principle of loyalty is illustrated in
Blankenship v. Boyle, 109 a case decided prior to the enactment of
ERISA under the common law and section 302(c)(5) of the TaftHartley Act." 0 The district court held that the United Mine
Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund, jointly administered by the
104

See notes 44 & 45 supra & accompanying texL

105 Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88.
106 See Feroleto Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 97, 108 (1977).
1o7 Freund v. Marshall & flsley Bank, [1979] PENs. .E'. (BNA), Oct. 22, 1979
(No. 262), at D-1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 24, 1979); Eaves v. Penn, 426 F. Supp. 830
(W.D. Okla. 1976), aff'd in relevant part and remanded on other grounds, 587
F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
108 Cf. Exemption from Prohibitions Respecting a Transaction Involving Stryco
Manufacturing Co. Pension Trust, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,455, 48,200 (1976) (extension
of loan for rebuilding of employer's plant destroyed by fire requires an exemption
from prohibited transaction rules).
109 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C.), stay denied per curiam, 444 F.2d 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11029 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1976). See notes 46-48 supra & accompanying
text.
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UMW and the coal industry, had imprudently maintained excessive
funds in noninterest-bearing accounts in a bank owned by the
union. The plaintiffs also challenged investments by the trust fund
in certain public utility companies on the theory that these investments had been acquired in order to force the utilities to purchase
coal produced by unionized companies. The evidence showed that
the Fund's acquisitions of utility stock had been coordinated with
those of the union and that the union had exercised the Fund's
proxies."' The court concluded that "[t]he intimate relationship
between the union's financial and organizing activities and the
utility investment activities of the trustees demonstrates that the
Fund was acting primarily for the collateral benefit of the union
and the signatory operators in making the most of its utility stock
acquisitions." 112 The court therefore found a "clear case of selfdealing" on the part of the union and management representatives
and also held the union liable for conspiring to benefit from the
breach of trust."Is
These conclusions of law in Blankenship v. Boyle are remarkable for two reasons. First, although the investments had declined in value, the court's holding rested on a breach of the duty
of loyalty and not on a violation of the prudent-man rule. Second,
in an unrelated portion of the opinion, the court recognized that,
"[i]n the longer view of matters, the union's strength protects the
interests of the beneficiaries, past and prospective." "'- Indeed, the
court specifically noted that "while the beneficiaries have suffered as
a result of the Fund's loss of investment income, they have benefited to some extent from the union's activities over the past twenty
years." 115 Thus, the court found a breach of the duty of loyalty
to the Funds' beneficiaries despite an express recognition that, in
an indirect sense, workers would benefit from investment practices
that strengthened the union."('
The ERISA obligation on fiduciaries to act in the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries is at least as stringent as the
common-law obligation enforced in Blankenship v. Boyle. A pri111 329 F. Supp. at 1105-06.

112 Id. 1106.
"3

Id.

11Id. 1112.
16 Il
116 Recently, Blankenship
trustees pursued policies which
fund but which were intended,
the welfare of its members."
F. Supp. 1248, 1256 (S.D.N.Y.

has been characterized as a case "in which the
may incidentally have aided the beneficiaries of the
primarily, to enhance the position of the Union and
Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of N.Y., 447
1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
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mary legislative justification for ERISA's enactment was the failure
of common-law remedies to ensure the integrity of employee pension plans.1 17 The legislative history evinces deep congressional
concern not only with conflicts of interest on the part of employerssuch as investment in employer stock-but also with union selfdealing.1 :8 The courts have followed suit and found a breach of
the duty to act solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries when, for example, plan assets are used to pay salaries of
plan employees who are engaged principally in conducting the
business of the union.11 9 Thus, at a minimum, the "solely in the
interest" test of ERISA section 404 (a) (1) prohibits any socialinvesting program founded simply on the notion that a stronger
union or stronger employer would be of indirect benefit to the participants and beneficiaries.
It may be a thin line separating investments "solely in the interest" of participants from those intended to benefit the company
or the union. For example, William Sidell, Vice President of the
AFL-CIO Building Trades Department, has argued that a policy of
investment in unionized projects will "not only provide earnings to
fund retirement benefits, but will also help assure that the plan is
still ongoing by the time the participant is ready to retire." 120
Others may argue that investments strengthening the employer are
necessary if the employer's financial weakness impairs its ability to
contribute to the plans, thereby imperiling employee benefits.
An interesting analogy is provided by Withers v. Teachers'
Retirement System of New York, 121 in which courts applying
common-law fiduciary standards upheld the decision of the New
York City municipal unions to commit more than $2.5 billion of
their pension funds to the speculative bonds of financially ailing
New York City. The district court concluded that "neither the
protection of the jobs of the City's teachers nor the general public
17

See notes 60-62 supra & accompanying text.

118 See 120 CoNG. REc. 29956-57 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff), reprinted
in 3 ERISA LEG. HIST., supra note 43, at 4811-12; 120 CONG. REc. 29951 (1974)

(remarks of Sen. Bentsen), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEG. HIST., supra note 43, at
4795-96; 120 CONG. REc. 29932 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted in
3 ERISA LEG. MIST., supra note 43, at 4743; 120 CONG. REc. 29192-93 (1974)
(remarks of Rep. Perkins), reprintedin 3 ERISA LEG. HisT., supra note 43, at 4657;
120 CONG. BEc. 4281 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Gaydos), reprinted in 2 ERISA
LEG. HIST., supra note 43, at 3377.
119 E.g., Marshall v. Snyder, 430 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 572
F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1978).
120 Testimony Before President's Commission on Pension Policy (Dec. 11,
1979) (prepared statement on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
121447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
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welfare were factors which motivated the trustees in their investment decision." 122 Rather, the trustees had sought to maintain the
City's solvency because the City was the principal contributor to the
23
funds and the ultimate guarantor of the employees' pensions.1

It

should be noted, however, that the trustees responsible for the New
York City rescue made their commitment conditional on both the
passage of state legislation authorizing them to consider the need
to maintain the City as a contributor to the funds and the receipt
of federal assurances that such investments would not jeopardize
the tax-exempt status of the funds under the exclusive-benefit rule
of section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code.124 Furthermore, the
fact pattern of Withers, involving the threatened bankruptcy of a
key municipality, may be considered to be sui generis. Thus,
Withers arguably states the exception rather than the rule with
respect to plan investments intended to support a sponsoring
2 51
employer.
2. The "Solely in the Interest" Requirement in the Absence
of Self-Dealing
Of course, not all forms of social investing need be tainted by
fiduciary of self-dealing.u 6 A trustee's reasons for a particular social investment may derive from genuine concern for the welfare
of plan participants and beneficiaries. For example, a policy of
investment in local companies might be predicated on the thought
that a stronger local economy will provide economic benefits to
plan participants and their families. Also, a refusal to invest in
122 Id. 1256.
28
The court distinguished Blankenship v. Boyle, claiming that any benefit the
'
Blankenship plan participants may have derived from the trust policy of investing
in utilities to force them to buy union-mined coal was "incidental" to gains inuring
to the union. See 329 F. Supp. at 12,56; note 116 supra. This distinction, however,
appears tenuous in light of the fact that the level of contributions to the UMW
pension fund was a direct function of the tonnage of union coal mined.
24

1

See 447 F. Supp. at 1258.

Of course, such investments must also pass muster under the stringent
See
"prohibited transaction" rules of ERISA, § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1976).
notes 181-206 infra & accompanying text.
126 It remains to be seen how the courts will approach future "ideological selfdealing" designed by a trustee to fulfill his own political or moral objectives. For
example, it might be argued that a fiduciary who refuses to invest in companies
doing business in South Africa because of his abhorrence of that country's racial
policies is acting in his own interest and not that of the plan participants, even
though the trustee derives no economic benefit from the investment plan. To avoid
liability under the "solely in the interest standard," it would seem that the trustee
would have to present, at the very least, some coherent showing that such an
investment policy was undertaken with some notion of the interests of the plan
participants in mind rather than as a mere expression of his own ideology.
125
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companies that persistently violate federal health and safety standards might rest on the premise that such a policy would pressure
these companies into compliance, thereby indirectly shaping the
prevailing standards for occupational safety in the industry in
2
which the plan participants are employed.' 7
Cases in which the investment is prudent, in which there is no
indication of self-interested conduct on the part of the fiduciary, and
in which the employees are arguably receiving some benefit from
the proposed investment policy pose the most difficult issues under
ERISA section 404 (a) (1). The central issue then becomes whether
an investment policy that confers benefits on plan participants as
part of a much larger group-such as local residents or workers
generally-satisfies.
Given the "solely in the interest" standard, this issue is best
addressed by examining congressional attitudes towards social investing and particularly social investing that benefits plan participants
as part of a larger group. 28 The declaration of policy advanced in
section 2 of ERISA 129 makes no reference to the objective of providing nonfinancial benefits to the employees through a socially
responsible investment policy, nor does it refer to any larger group
of statutory beneficiaries. Indeed, the focus of this declaration and
127 In either case, the trustee's position might be fortified, if the employees or
representatives formally endorsed the particular policy of social investment as
consistent with the employees' interests.
128 See 119 CONG. REc. 12076 (1973) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in
1 ERISA LEG. HisT., supra note 43, at 276.
129ERISA, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976), provides in relevant part:
(a) The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers
of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial;
... that owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare and
the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be
provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration
of such plans; . . . that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum
standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate
funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the
termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees
and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and
that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and to
provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided
assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect
thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation
for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
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the accompanying findings is on the need for fiduciary standards
that will ensure the financial "soundness" and "stability" of the
plans.130
This emphasis is readily understandable in light of the factual
record on which Congress acted. The hearings exposed numerous
examples of self-dealing, mismanagement, and inadequate funding
of plan obligations. 13 ' The committee reports stress the need for
strict fiduciary standards that would ensure that employees receive the benefits to which they are entitled. 32 Thus, the key
congressional concern was to find means to assure greater financial
stability of employee benefit plans, 133 not to encourage more creative
uses of plan assets.
Indeed, although several proposals designed to encourage social investing were placed before Congress, none were enacted into
law. For example, Walter Reuther of the UAW urged that Congress "provide within the framework of ... [the federal] standards

enough latitude so that the trustees could invest, with proper safeguards, some of those trust funds in . . . high social priority

projects." '.3 His remarks, however, did not spark much enthusiasm
from key congressmen. 13 5
Later in the same hearings, Representative Pucinski asked Secretary of Labor George Shultz whether language should be written
into the bill protecting investment managers who decided to invest
in low-income housing for senior citizen members. 36 Such investments could be constructed to benefit plan retirees. Shultz's answer was a cautious one, submitted in written form. Despite an
awareness of the need to finance low-cost housing, he stated that
"care must be taken to ensure that an effort to this end does not
run counter to the purposes of employee benefit plans, which are
130 Id.
131 See notes 60-62 supra & accompanying text.

132 See, e.g., 1973 H.R. REP., supra note 61, at 12, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
& AD. Nxws 4639, 4650, also reprinted in 2 ERISA LEG. HiST., supra

CODE CONG.

note 43, at 2348, 2359; 1973 S.REP., supra note 61, at 2, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 4838, 4839, also reprinted in I ERISA LEG. HiST.,
supra note 43, at 587, 588.

See 120 CoNG. REc. 29928-31 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams) reprinted
in 3 ERISA LE. HIST., supra note 43, at 4734.
33

1

134private Welfare Hearings, supra note 16, at 194 (testimony of Walter
Reuther).
136 See, e.g., id. 195 (remarks of Congressman Dent) ("I might observe that

the committee has been giving serious consideration that the prudent investors
rule be the guideline for investments in the private sector").
136 Id. 528 (question of Rep. Pucinski). See notes 146 & 147 infra & accompanying text.
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also socially desirable." 137 The Administration did not wish to
"single out employee pension funds from other investment sources
to bear a larger burden of riskier investments and low yields such
as would be required by section 511 of [the bill]." 138 The Secretary also pointed out that the Administration bill already contained
language which appeared to permit the parties establishing a plan
to incorporate directions instructing a fiduciary to make certain
investments without regard to the prudent-man rule. 139 The language upon which the Secretary relied did not appear, however, in
the enacted version of the bill, a further indication that Congress's
intent may have been to narrow, rather than widen, the scope of
the fiduciary's discretion.
A third proposal placed before Congress was a draft bill championed by Ralph Nader and Karen Ferguson of the Public Interest
Research Group. This proposal envisioned the establishment of
private, competitive retirement benefit funds that could place up
to ten percent of their assets in social investments. The propriety
of these investments would be judged by the extent to which they
reduced expenses typically incurred during retirement. 140 This
proposal also drew unenthusiastic response from the committee, 4 1
and once again, Congress refused to adopt any specific provision
authorizing socially dictated or even socially sensitive investment
policies, even though plan participants would benefit as part of
a larger group.
In light of these congressional responses to specific proposals
for social investing, it appears inappropriate to stretch the "solely
Id. 529 (statement of George Shultz).
Id. The bill to which the Secretary was referring, H.R. 17495, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 21601-04 (1970), required that private pension plans
and foundations with assets of more than four million dollars invest up to 2.5% of
their net assets in the securities of a National Development Bank that would lend
funds for certain socially desirable purposes. See id., § 511; 116 CoNG. .Ec. 21584
(1970). The House Committee recommended deletion of this section of the bill
and the House supported that decision. Id. 21587-90. The bill was ultimately
enacted into law as the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91351, 84 Stat. 450 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
139 Private Welfare Hearings, supra note 16, at 529 (statement of George
Shultz). Section 14 of the Administration bill, H.R. 16462, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970), Private Welfare Hearings, supra note 16, at 1-13, contained general fiduciary standards and prohibited-transaction rules, but provided in § 14(c) (7) that
nothing in that section would be construed to prohibit any fiduciary from "following the direction in the trust instrument or other document governing the fund insofar as consistent with the [prohibited-transaction rules of that section]." Id. 10.
140 Pension Plan Hearings, supra note 19, at 260 (statement of Ralph Nader
and Karen Ferguson).
141 "Up to now we know of no standard that controls investment decisions
better than the prudent man rule. If we want to go beyond that, we could write
specific limitations into the bill." Id. 293 (statement of Rep. Dent).
'37
138
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in the interest" language of section 404(a). As the Act's declaration
of policy makes clear, Congress enacted ERISA with the relatively
narrow objective of assuring adequate financial security for retired
workers. Even an investment policy that is intended to benefit
plan participants as one small segment of the community of American citizens or workers may not be safe from attack. In such situations, the investment policy apparently is susceptible to challenge
under ERISA on the ground that it is not "solely in the interest"
of plan participants but rather is intended to vindicate the interests
of a much larger group of beneficiaries.
Nevertheless, an argument can be made that when a fiduciary
has narrowed his list of potential investments to economically comparable alternatives, the statute should not proscribe his selection of
the alternative that in the long run may produce indirect benefits
to the participants as members of some larger group. Assuming
total financial comparability under the prudence standard between
two investments and assuming further that the fiduciary acts without any trace of self-interest or self-vindication, it is difficult to see
any harm in a socially sensitive investment policy that may produce
some extra benefits for the participants. Although the prospect of
such benefits may be speculative, and the magnitude of such benefits for the individual participant may not be impressive, the fiduciary may aid the interests of his beneficiaries more by opting for
such an alternative than by randomly or arbitrarily choosing some
other alternative that offers no potential by-product advantages at
14 2

all .

The problem with this analysis is that its assumptions may be
unrealistic. Even though several investments may be economically
comparable in terms of consistency with the plan's investment objectives, they may offer slight differences in probable risk, return, and
diversification value. Thus, the selection of one alternative over
another might involve some small sacrifice in financial value. Once
noneconomic considerations are permitted entry into the analysis,
there is a real danger that the fiduciary will be tempted to choose
one investment on the basis of its perceived general utility to the
community rather than to refine further the comparison of financial
characteristics to determine whether there is actual equivalence
between the investments. A further difficulty with the premises of
142 In recent testimony before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly, and
Business Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Ian Lanoff, the Administrator of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs of the Department of Labor, took
the position that where two investments were equally desirable from an economic
standpoint, social factors could then be considered in determining which investment
to select. See STAF BEPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
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this argument is that the fiduciary may not be able to demonstrate
that the socially sensitive policy followed was intended to benefit
the interests of the beneficiaries, rather than to vindicate his own
interests or views. 14 3
Considering these difficulties, it is probably wiser for a plan
fiduciary to act at all times with the interests of the plan participants, as participants, directly in mind. Senator Williams, the Senate floor manager of ERISA, recently emphasized this statutory focus
on the retirement interests of participants:
[S]ituations may arise where the interests of active employees may be at odds with the retirement income security
interests of those same employees or present retirees. In
such cases, a pension plan fiduciary with investment responsibility must choose the course which is consistent with
the primary duty of loyalty to the retirement income needs
of plan participants. M4
Construing the statute to place primary emphasis on the retirement interests of participants does not preclude all forms of social
investing. Arguably, the Act's objective of assuring financial security for retired workers may be served by investments that not only
help pay plan benefits, but also tend to reduce the expenses of plan
participants during their retirement years. For example, an employee pension fund could supply capital to build low-cost housing
for the elderly in a community where its beneficiaries reside. Investment in housing to be used in substantial part by the plan participants and their beneficiaries would appear to satisfy the "solely
in the interest" standard and would be permissible if it met the
prudence test. 145 As the Senate Committee Report noted, the "most
important purpose" of ERISA was "to assure American workers
that they may look forward with anticipation to a retirement with
financial security and dignity, and without fear that this period of
life will be lacking in the necessities to sustain them as human beings within our society." 146 Because an investment in housing for
the elderly is consistent with that purpose, a court would be more
14 3 See notes 107-25 supra & accompanying text.

Union officials may have
difficulty proving, for example, that a policy of investing only in unionized companies is intended to benefit the participants as workers rather than the union itself.
144 125 CoNe. iREc. S560 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
145 See notes 136-39 supra & accompanying text.
:146 1973 S. REP., supra note 61, at 13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4838, 4849, also reprinted in 1 ERISA Luc. HisT., supra note 43, at
587, 599.
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liKely to uphold a close, judgmental decision to invest in such housing challenged under the loyalty standard. 147
Of course, this rationale, too, could be stretched to unreasonable limits. Will not a stronger local economy, or a free society,
also benefit the plan participants in their retirement years? Perhaps,
but with such a tenuous link, it is difficult to say that the primary
purpose of such an investment is to benefit the plan participants,
rather than to achieve some other purpose for some other group of
beneficiaries. Moreover, it is questionable whether such psychological benefits are among the "necessities" that Congress intended
to assure for retired workers. Indeed, the language of section
404 (a)(1) (A) of the Act raises the issue whether a fiduciary can
seek to maximize any benefits other than the purely financial ones
to be paid from the plan's assets, a question discussed below.
D. Social Investing Under the "Exclusive Purpose" Rule
ERISA section 404 (a) (1) (A) requires that the fiduciary discharge his duties "for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." 148 Under standard
principles of statutory construction, this exclusive-purpose requirement cannot be read simply as a reiteration of the duty of loyalty
owed to the participants and beneficiaries under section 404(a)(1). 149
Thus, courts will seek an interpretation which imposes some
further limitation on a fiduciary's conduct.
What this additional limitation will be, however, is far from
clear. One might argue, for example, that section 404 (a)(1) (A)
restricts the permissible objectives of an investment program to
maximizing the size and security of the fund from which cash benefits are to be paid. The language of the provision lends a certain
plausibility to this argument. The command of section 401 (a)
of the Internal Revenue Code-that the employer maintain the
plan "for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries"-has been modified. The ERISA phrasing emphasizes that
the fiduciary's exclusive purpose must be to provide benefits.'50
147 Alternatively, a court presented with a difficult issue concerning a fiduciary's
motives under the loyalty standard may avoid the problem by focusing greater
scrutiny on the prudence test to determine whether the investment was actually
"comparable" to other alternatives.
148 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (A) (1976).
14 9 See 2A J. SUTHErIAND, STATTEs AND STATUTORY CoNsTRntcnoN § 46.06
(4th ed.
1973).
50
See also EBISA Report, supra note 77, at 234 (pointing out that the

conference report implies that compliance with Internal Revenue Code is not sufficient under the ERISA "exclusive purpose" rule).
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Although the term "benefits" is arguably broad enough to encompass all of the rewards-moral and financial, direct and indirectthat a participant might reap from an investment program, the
term is used more narrowly throughout the Act to refer to those
cash benefits that a participant or his family would receive in accordance with the specifications of the plan.151 Moreover, the word
"benefits" in section 404(a)(1)(A)(i) occupies a position parallel to
the term "expenses" in section 404(a)(1)(A)(ii), so that it appears
to refer only to cash benefits under the plan rather than the potential indirect benefits of an investment program. Thus, if the "exclusive purpose" rule is viewed as a restriction on the investment
objectives of a fiduciary, it could have a restrictive impact beyond
that of the "solely in the interest" requirement, prohibiting socially
sensitive as well as socially dictated investment practices.
Indeed, the "exclusive purpose" rule of section 404(a)(1)(A)
reiterates and enforces the identical direction of ERISA section
403(c)(l).152 In the original version of the legislation, both of these
"exclusive purpose" phrases appeared in the same section of the
bill. The section entitled "Fiduciary Responsibility" began with
the broad declaration, "[e]very employee benefit plan shall be
deemed to be a trust," and then identified the "exclusive purposes"
for which the trust assets were to be "held." 153 Thus, this language
was conceived as a general limitation on the purposes of an ERISA
employee benefit plan and could be viewed as a restriction on the
permissible investment objectives of such a plan.
There is some doubt, however, that the exclusive-purpose rule
was intended to restrict investment activity. Rather, it is plausible
to conclude that the provision was intended to govern only the expenditure of plan funds by prohibiting all disbursements other
than the payment of benefits to the plan participants and their
beneficiaries and the payment of reasonable administrative expenses.
This construction is consistent with early Labor Department enforcement actions under ERISA that successfully relied oia this
provision to attack disbursements for excessive administrative fees
and unnecessary expenses (such as the lease of an aircraft for the
plan) in addition to payments of benefits not contemplated by the
151E~g.,

ERISA,

§§2(a),

3(22),

3(34),

3(35),

29 U.S.C.

§§1001(a),

1002(22), 1002(34), 1002(35) (1976).
15 2 "[T]he assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer
and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants
in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administer-

ing the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1976).
15 3H.R. 2, §111(a)(1), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), 1 ERISA LEG. H-isv.,
supra note 43, at 41.
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plan or to persons not covered by the plan.154 Because of the
strength of the other fiduciary provisions discussed above, and in
light of the apparent purpose of this provision to curb improper
expenditures, there is little compelling need for the courts to apply
the exclusive-purpose rule to investment issues. 55
If, because of section 404(a)(l)'s all-encompassing introductory
language, the exclusive-purpose rule is nevertheless construed to
apply to investment activities, perhaps the most reasonable construction would be the fairly restrictive interpretation of the "solely in
the interest" requirement discussed above. 56 In this view, the "exclusive purpose" language would suggest that ERISA trusts are to
be established and maintained for the limited purpose of providing
retirement benefits and not for other, socially desirable purposes
which provide collateral or speculative "benefits" to plan participants or appeal to the philosophical leanings of the plan sponsor or
other parties associated with the plan.
In summary, although the issue is not free from doubt, the
"exclusive purpose" language of ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) may
be construed as an additional restriction on the scope of permissible
investment practices. In any event, the courts may face a difficult
task integrating this subsection with the prudence rule of ERISA
section 404(a)(1)(B) and the "solely in the interest" language of
ERISA section 404(a)(1), that independently set minimum financial requirements and circumscribe the allowable objectives of an
ERISA investment program.
E. Social Investing and the "In Accordance With Plan
Documents" Rule
Some commentators have suggested that a key factor with respect to the legality of social investing is the type of authorization
set forth in the governing trust document. 57 This would be true
in the context of private trusts,' 5 8 and to a limited extent for ERISA
trusts. Certainly, if the trust agreement expressly proscribes any
'54 Marshall v. Snyder, 430 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d
894 (2d Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Knee, No. C-33-77-93 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 1977)
(consent order); Marshall v. Wilson, No. 3-76-373 (E.D. Tenn. June 6, 1977)
(consent order).
155 It has also been argued that the conference report treats the "solely in the
interest" and "exclusive purpose" requirements as equivalent. ERISA Report, supra
note 77, at 232 & n.6.
156 See notes 99-147 supra& accompanying text.
'
'

57

58

See Ravikoff, supra note 5, at 534-35.
See note 38 supra & accompanying text.
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form of social investment, that prohibition can limit the trustee's
investment activity.
The terms of the statute, however, do not appear to countenance the converse proposition. Under ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D),
the plan documents cannot authorize a policy of social investment
that would otherwise be impermissible under the fiduciary standards of the Act. 159 Indeed, ERISA requires a fiduciary to disregard
the plan documents if compliance with the documents would be
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. 16 0 The plan
documents cannot, therefore, remove or relax the requirements that
a fiduciary act prudently and solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries. 6" Nor can the plan documents be drafted
to override other provisions, such as a fiduciary's obligation to review the investment activity undertaken by predecessor fiduciaries
2

16
to the plan.

The legislative history of ERISA confirms this interpretation
of the statute. In identical language, the Senate and House committee reports explained that one reason for establishing federal
fiduciary standards is to negate the tendency of the common law to
permit deviations from fiduciary standards when authorized by the
trust instrument. 16 3 The common law of trusts "developed in the
context of testamentary and inter vivos trusts ...

with an attendant

emphasis on carrying out the instructions of the setdor." 164 Because of this context, if the trust document included language authorizing investments that would otherwise be imprudent or an
exculpatory clause relieving the trustee from liability for a breach
of trust, the common law of many states might permit such a devia159 ERISA § 404(a) (1) (D) requires that a fiduciary discharge his duties "in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such
documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter."
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1976).
160 This point is underlined by ERISA § 410(a): "Except as provided in sections 405(b)(1) and 405(d), any provision in an agreement or instrument which
purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility,
obligation, or duty shall be void as against public policy." 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a)
(1976).
161 Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978) (Even though profit-sharing
plan had been restructured as employee stock-ownership plan, investment in employer stock would be subject to "prudence" and "solely in the interest" tests.).
162 Marshall v. Craft, 463 F. Supp. 493, 497 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
163 See 1973 H.R. RE ., supra note 61, at 12, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ai. NEws 4639, 4650, also reprinted in 2 ERISA LEG. HisT., supra note 43,
at 2348, 2359; 1973 S. REP., supra note 61, at 29, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4838, 4865, also reprinted in 1 ERISA LEG. HYST., supra note
43, at 587, 615.
164 See sources cited in note 163 supra.
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tion from sound fiduciary principles. 1 s Whatever its value in the
context of personal trusts, Congress viewed this principle as inappropriate in the context of employee benefit plans covering hundreds, or even thousands, of employees. Thus, ERISA was designed
to require a fiduciary to act "in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the fund unless they are inconsistent with
the fiduciary principles in this section." 166
Although the plan documents themselves cannot expand the
scope of investments permissible under ERISA, they may direct
fiduciaries with investment discretion to give special attention to
particular types of investments. If such investments may be harmonized with the statutory rules of prudence, diversification, and
loyalty, the plan documents may direct the fiduciaries to select such
investments over other comparable alternatives. The plan documents might also be useful in establishing priorities between different social objectives. It is essential, however, that these general
guidelines be formulated "solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries." 167 Investment guidelines tainted by other concerns would themselves be violative of the statute, no matter how
much flexibility they demonstrated.
The plan documents may also allocate responsibility for making
investments, including social investments, among the fiduciaries or
delegate them to others. 6 8 If the allocation or delegation of the
fiduciary's authority follows the procedure set forth in the plan
document, 69 the Act expressly limits the potential liability of the
named fiduciary. 70 Thus, appropriate language in the plan documents will permit the named fiduciaries to allocate to a trustee
sufficient authority to manage a portion of the portfolio in accord165

In some states, however, such deviations were precluded by statute.

See

note 38 supra.
166 1973 H.R. REP., supra note 61, at 13, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4639, 4651, also reprinted in 2 ERISA IEG. Hrs., supra note 43,
at 2348, 2360; 1973 S. REP., supra note 61, at 30, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONe. & AD. NEws 4838, 4866, aso reprinted in 1 ERISA LEG. IsT., supra note
43, at 587, 616.
167ERISA, §404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1976).
' 0 8ERISA, §405(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c) (1976).
169 ERISA, §§402(b)(2), 405(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§1102(b)(2), 1105(c)(1)
(1976). SEE CoNEBNcE REPORT, supra note 56, at 301, reprinted in [1974]

U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5081, also reprinted in 3 ERISA LEc. HXsT.,

supra note 43, at 4277, 4568.

See also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-13, FR-14

(1979).
170 The named fiduciary remains liable only to the extent he has failed to meet

the Act's fiduciary standards with respect to selection of the delegate, establishment
of the procedure used to allocate or delegate authority, or termination of the delegation when circumstances require such action. ERISA, § 405(c) (2), 29 U.S.C.
§1105(c)(2) (1976).
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ance with a socially sensitive investment policy. In that event, the
named fiduciaries will no longer be responsible for each investment
decision of the trustee. Nevertheless, the named fiduciaries do remain liable for failure to select a responsible trustee,17 1 for failure
to review periodically the trustee's performance to ensure that it is
in accordance with the duties of prudence and loyalty, 172 or for

originating any instructions on social investing that are inconsistent
with the fiduciary standards of ERISA. 173
Similarly, the plan documents may authorize the trustee to
delegate investment authority over a portion of the portfolio to
another person. The structure of the Act suggests, however, that
the trustee remains liable for all investment decisions on those assets unless the person to whom authority is delegated is an "investment manager," which is a defined term in ERISA.174 An
investment manager must be either a bank, an investment adviser
registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,175 or an insurance company, and must acknowledge in writing its role as a
fiduciary. 17 Thus, although an informal advisory committee not
meeting this definition could suggest various types of social invest1 77
ments or recommend how stock held by the plan should be voted,
both the trustee and the committee remain liable under the Act for
implementing any instructions of the committee.
Moreover, every fiduciary to the plan can be held liable for
concealing, enabling, or failing to remedy a breach of duty on the
part of a cofiduciary. 178 Thus, a named fiduciary or trustee aware
that a cofiduciary has exercised its investment authority to make
imprudent social investments must take appropriate remedial action,
171See

ERISA, §405(c)(2)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. §1105(c)(2)(A)(i) (1976).
§ 2509.75-8, Question FR-17 (1979).

17229 C.F.R.
3-7See

(iii) (1976).

ERISA, §405(e)(9.)(h)(ii), (iii), 29 U.S.C. §ll05(e)(2)(A)(ii),
Although the plan may authorize the named fiduciaries to give direc-

tions to the trustee, the trustee is subject only to "proper" directions that are "made

in accordance with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to this subchapter." ERISA, §403(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1103(a)(1) (1976). The trustee
may be held liable for following instructions which on their face violate the fiduciary standards of the Act. CONrENCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 298-300, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5078-81, also reprinted in
3 ERISA LEG. HisT., supra note 43, at 4277, 4565-67.
' 7 4 See ERISA, §§402(c)(3), 403(a), 29 U.S.C. §§1102(c)(3), 1103(a)
(1976). See also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Question FR-15 (1979).
17r §§201-221, 15 U.S.C. §§80b-i to -21 (1976).
176 ERISA, § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (1976).
1 7
7 As noted earlier, the recent Chrysler-UAW settlement appears to contemplate this kind of advisory committee. See note 14 supra.

178ERISA, §405(a), 29 U.S.C. §1105(a)

(1976).

CoN-mEcE

REPoRT,

supra note 56, at 299-300, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CoNe. & AD. NEws 5038,
5080, also reprinted in 3 ERISA LEG. HIsT., supra note 43, at 4277, 4566-67.
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such as selling the investment 7 9 or reporting the violation to the
Department of Labor. 8 0
In summary, the plan documents can provide a framework for
distributing investment authority and a list of priority investments,
but they cannot expand the universe of permissible social investments beyond that authorized by the other ERISA standards, nor
can they relieve the named fiduciaries and trustees of their ultimate
responsibility for the safety of the plan assets.
F. Social Investing and ERISA's Prohibited-TransactionRules
In addition to general fiduciary standards, ERISA contains
"prohibited transaction" rules which may restrict certain types of
activity often discussed in the context of social investing. ERISA
section 406(a) 181 prohibits several kinds of transactions between a
plan and a "party in interest" with respect to the plan and ERISA
section 406(b) 182 precludes self-dealing on the part of plan fiduciaries. ERISA's prohibited-transaction rules are absolute struc' 79Morrissey v. Curran, 567 F.2d 546, 548-49 (2d Cir. 1977); see Marshall
v. Craft, 463 F. Supp. 493, 497 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
180 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, Question FR-10 (1979).
-81 Under § 406(a)(1) of ERISA, the following transactions are prohibited:
A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a
transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes
a direct or indirect(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between the plan and a
party in interest;
(B) lending of money or other extension of credit between the plan and a
party in interest;
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party
in interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest, of any
assets of the plan; or
(E) acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of any employer security or employer
real property in violation of section 407(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (1976).
Section 4975(c) of the Internal Revenue Code contains a list of prohibited
transactions very similar to the one in ERISA § 406.
182 Section 406(b) of ERISA imposes several additional constraints on the
behavior of plan fiduciaries. Under this subsection, a fiduciary may not:
(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own
account;
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction
involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose
interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its
participants or beneficiaries; or
(3) receive any consideration for his own personal account from any party
dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the
assets of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (1976).
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"fairness,"

or

3

Despite the critical
importance of these restrictions, they have rarely been analyzed in
the context of discussions on social investing.
In order to appreciate the scope of the section 406(a)(1) prohibitions, one must take into account the breadth of the statutory
definition of the term "party in interest." ERISA section 3(14) defines a "party in interest" to include not only all fiduciaries, but
also any entity providing services to the plan, any employer or
employee organization whose employees are covered by the plan,
any person owning more than fifty percent of the employer, and any
relative of the persons described above. 184 The ERISA definition
of "party in interest" extends even further to encompass affiliated
persons such as employees, officers, directors, or ten percent shareholders of the previously described parties, and any enterprise in
which those parties own an interest of fifty percent or more.'8
Thus, the union and employer, and almost anyone and any company
affiliated with them, will be "parties in interest" within the meaning of the Act, and therefore prohibited from dealing with the

plan.

86

183 Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1979); M&R Investment Co.
v. Fitzsimmons, [1980] PENs. REP. (BNA), Feb. 4, 1980 (No. 276), at D-9 (D.
Nev. Jan. 14, 1980). In Cutaiar,the court admitted that:
[T]his case involves no taint of scandal, no hint of self-dealing, no trace
of bad faith. The violation was concededly a technical one, the result of
a misunderstanding of the requirements of the newly enacted ERISA bolstered by the result of good faith submission of the dispute to impartial
arbitration. Uncontradicted testimony before the district court established
that the terms of the transaction were fair and reasonable with respect to
both plans. Id. 528.
Nevertheless, the court upheld the position of the Department of Labor that the
transaction violated ERISA's prohibited transaction rules.
Similarly, in M&R Investment Co. v.
18429 U.S.C. §1002(14) (1976).
Fitzsimmons, [1980] PENS. REP. (BNA), Feb. 4, 1980 (No. 276), at D-9 (D. Nev.
Jan. 14, 1980), the court emphasized that neither lack of harm to the plan nor the
good faith of the fiduciaries was relevant to a determination whether a prohibited
transaction had occurred.
185 Id. A pending amendment to ERISA, the ERISA Improvement Act of
1979, proposes minor changes to the definition of "party in interest." See S. 209,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONe. REc. S561, S573 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979). The
amendment would narrow the scope of the definition to permit dealings between
the plan and 1) an intermittent provider of nonprofessional services, 2) an employer
whose employees constitute less than five percent of all employees covered by the
plan, or 3) an employee organization whose members constitute less than five
percent of all employees covered by the plan. Id.
186 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Labor Adv. Op., No. 78-25, reprinted in [1978]
WASHINGTON SERVIcE BUREAu, ERISA UPDATE [hereinafter cited as ERISA
UPDATE]; U.S. Dep't of Labor Adv. Op., No. 77-14, reprinted in [1977] ERISA
UPDATE, supra; U.S. Dep't of Labor Adv. Op., No. 76-91, reprinted in [1976]
ERISA UPDATE, supra.
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The additional section 406(b) restrictions were introduced in
the legislation to serve as absolute barriers to plan fiduciaries using
their discretionary authority in situations involving real or structural conflicts of interest.18 7 In this regard, the Act was patterned
after the earlier Senate versions of the bill, which contained specific
prohibitions against certain conduct, rather than after the earlier
House versions, which required that a plan fiduciary merely meet
the standard of an "arm's-length" transaction.18 8 The second
proscription in particular-prohibiting a fiduciary from representing a party with interests adverse to those of the plan ' 8 9--was designed to keep "a fiduciary from being put in a position where he
has dual loyalties, and, therefore, he cannot act exclusively for the
benefit of a plan's participants and beneficiaries." 190
The prohibitions that pose the greatest potential for difficulty
in the area of social investing are those contained in ERISA sections
406(a)(1)(D) and (E) and 406(b)(1) and (2). For example, as in
Blankenship v. Boyle,19 a union official who also served as a fiduciary to a plan covering union members might cause the plan to
invest its assets in a manner intended to benefit the union. Because the union would be a "party in interest" under section
3(14)(D), such an investment would violate section 406(a)(1)(D), in
that it would constitute the use of plan assets for the benefit of a
"party in interest." No actual transfer of assets between the plan
and the "party in interest" would be necessary for a prohibited
transaction to occur.1 92 Moreover, an indirect prohibited transaction would occur if a plan engaged in a transaction with a person
who was not a "party in interest" with an understanding that that
party would in turn engage in a transaction with a "party in
interest." 193
187 29 C.F.R. §2550.408b-2(e) (1)(1979).

188 See Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, [1979] PENS. BE1. (BNA), Oct 22,
1979 (No. 262), at D-1, D-8 (W.D. Wis. Sept 24, 1979); 120 CoNG. REc. 29932
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEG. HIsT., supra note

43, at 4743.
189 ERISA, § 406(b) (2), 29 U.S.C. §1106(b) (2) (1976).
190 CONF=NCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 309, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & Ai. NEws 5038, 5089, also reprinted in 3 ERISA LEG. HIST., supra note

43. at 4277, 4576.
191 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C.), stay denied per curiam, 447 F.2d 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), aff'd nem., 511 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See notes 109-19 supra
& accompanying text.
192 CoN!RENcE REPoRT, supra note 56, at 308, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5089, also reprinted in 3 ERISA LEG. HIsT., supra note
43, at 4277, 4575. See Marshall v. Snyder, 430 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd,193
572 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1978).
For examples of this phenomenon, see 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-2 (1979). See
also, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Labor Adv. Op., No. 75-103, reprinted in [1975] ERISA
UPDATE, supra note 186; U.S. Dep't of Labor Information Letter (WSB No. 78-17).
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This analysis also demonstrates the invalidity of an investment
benefiting the employer who maintained the plan.19 4 Further, any
direct investment by a defined benefit plan in employer securities
or real property would be limited to ten percent of the fair market
value of the plan's assets under ERISA sections 406(a)(1)(E) and
407(a).195
In addition, an employer investing plan assets in a manner designed to promote the employer's business would most likely run
afoul of the section 406(b)(1) prohibition against dealing with plan
assets in the fiduciary's own interest. 9 6 Finally, any plan fiduciary
representing another party's interest-for example, a union official
serving as plan trustee and investing plan assets in order to foster
the union's interests-might in some circumstances violate the section 406(b)(2) prohibition against acting on behalf of a party with
interests adverse to those of the plan. 191
Although ERISA section 408(b) 198 provides several statutory
exemptions from the Act's prohibited-transaction rules, these provisions would be inapplicable to the types of transactions that usu' 94 M & R Investment Co. v. Fitzsimmons, [1980] PENS. REP. (BNA), Feb. 4,
1980 (No. 276), at D-9 (D. Nev. Jan. 14, 1980). See also Labor Dep't Complaint,
Marshall v. Schmoutey, Civ. Action No. CVLV 77-47 RDF (D. Nev., filed March
30, 1977), reproduced in [1977] PENS. REP. (BNA), April 4, 1977 (No. 131), at
R-1 to R-3 (alleging a violation of ERISA §§406(a)(1)(B) and 406(a)(1)(D)
on the ground that the plan lent money to a corporation that was owned by an
individual who in turn owned a corporation owning more than 10% of yet another
corporation whose subsidiary employed persons employed by the plan). [19771
PLUs. REP. (BNA), April 4, 1977 (No. 131), at R-1, R-3.
195 See notes 11, 102 & 181 supra & accompanying text. This restriction does
not apply to an eligible individual account plan such as an employee stockownership or profit-sharing plan, if the plan explicitly provides for the purchase of
qualifying employer securities. See ERISA, §§407(b)(1), 407(d)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1107(b)(1), 1107(d)(3) (1976). Even in such plans, however, the investment
in employer stock must be prudent and solely in the interest of the participants.
See Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457-58 (10th Cir. 1978).
196 Because such transactions are prohibited, the parties have found it necessary to obtain exemptions from the Labor Department. See, e.g., Exemption from
Prohibitions Respecting a Transaction Involving the Univar Retirement Plan, 41
Fed. Reg. 46,799 (1976); Exemption from Prohibitions Respecting a Transaction
Involving Stryco Manufacturing Company Pension Trust, 41 Fed. Reg. 48,200
(1976); Exemption from Prohibitions Respecting a Transaction Involving the Given
International Employees' Stock Bonus Plan, 41 Fed. Reg. 54,080 (1976).
197 Exemptions from the prohibited-transaction rules have been necessary in
this context as well. See, e.g., Exemption from Prohibitions Respecting Certain
Transactions Involving the Alaska Teamsters-Employer Pension Trust, 41 Fed. Reg.
16,642 (1976); Exemption from Prohibitions Respecting Transaction Involving
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union No. 606 Health and
Welfare Fund, 41 Fed. Reg. 30,414 (1976); Exemption from Prohibitions Respecting a Transaction Involving the Iron Workers' Apprentice Fund, 42 Fed. Reg.
13,633 (1977).
19829 U.S.C. § 1108(b) (1976).
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ally arise in the context of social investing. 199 A fiduciary truly
determined to pursue a course of social investing could also attempt
to seek an administrative exemption according to the procedures
detailed in section 408(a).200 This process, however, is expensive
and time consuming; most prohibited-transaction exemption applications are handled on a case-by-case basis. 201 And even if the
fiduciary is granted an exemption from the prohibitions of section
406, the exemption cannot override general ERISA standards.
The fiduciary would remain bound by the prudence and loyalty
requirements of section 404.202
The limited utility of the exemption procedure as a means of
furthering a policy of social investing is illustrated in one case in
which such an exemption was granted to permit an otherwise prohibited socially sensitive investment. Multiple-employer plans
covering employees in the building trades traditionally have invested a percentage of their assets in construction loans to contributing employers as a means of providing work opportunities for plan
participants. Even though such loans may be intended to promote the interests of plan members, they are inconsistent with the
strucural prohibition of ERISA section 406(a)(1)(B).
Thus, in order to preserve this practice, the Labor Department
found it necessary to grant a limited class exemption covering such
loans. 203 The exemption restricts the practice in a number of
important respects, however. For example, the loan decision must
be made by an independent bank, savings and loan association, or
insurance company; the aggregate amount of such loans to a single
employer must not exceed ten percent of the plan assets; and the
aggregate amount of such loans to all participating employers must
not exceed thirty-five percent of the plan assets. 204 In addition,
199 Section 408(b) permits, for example, fair and reasonable loans to plan participants and beneficiaries and investment of plan assets as deposits in a fiduciary

bank in certain situations. See ERISA, § 408(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b) (1976).
20029 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1976).
See also 40 Fed. Reg. 18,471 (1975); Exee.
Order No. 12,108, 44 Fed. Reg. 1065 (1979) (ordering the implementation of
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1978)).
201 See, e.g., notes 196 & 197 supra (exemptions).
20229 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976).
All the administrative exemptions granted thus
far contain specific language stating that the plan fiduciaries must still adhere to
the general standards of ERISA § 404.

203 Prohibited Transaction Exemption 76-1, Class Exemptions From Prohibi-

tions Respecting Certain Transactions in Which Multiemployer and Multiple Employer Plans Are Involved, 41 Fed. Reg. 12,740 (1976).
204 Id. 12,743.
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the exemption does not authorize the use of plan assets for permanent mortgage loans for the benefit of contributing employees. 20 5
In view of the impact of ERISA's prohibited-transaction rules
on at least certain social-investing practices, major structural changes
in the law may be required to permit many of the types of transactions often considered in the context of social investing. The currently existing exemption process would require the Department of
Labor to decide directly which "socially desirable" investments are
"in the interests of the plan and its participants and beneficiaries,"
and "protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of
such plan." 208 It is doubtful, however, whether the Department,
the Congress, or the public at large would favor such a broad and
unstructured grant of authority to pass judgment on the merits of
a given form of social investing. A legislative remedy may therefor be necessary.
IV. THE

PROSPECT OF LITIGATION INVOLVING SOCIAL INVESTING

To date, there has been no litigation under ERISA challenging
the social-investment practices of private employee benefit plans. It
would not be surprising, however, if such litigation accompanied
the spread of social-investment theory and practice. The jurisdictional provisions of the statute encourage suits by plan members
and fiduciaries; in addition to the. Department of Labor, any participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary can sue the plan or its fiduciaries. 202 The federal district courts have jurisdiction of such actions
without regard to jurisdictional amount 208 and are authorized to
provide complete relief.20 9

Finally, as an incentive to such suits,

the statute authorizes the court to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 210
In addition to such statutory encouragement, the number of
potential plaintiffs also suggests the likelihood of future litigation.
As noted earlier 2 1 1 litigation seems much more likely in the case
205 Id. 12,742. Thus, a commitment from a plan to a participating employer
to provide permanent mortgage loans to persons purchasing improved real property
from the participating employer, would be prohibited by the Act.
f08EBISA, §408(a)( 2 ), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a)(2), (3) (1976).

207ERISA, § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a) (1976).

208 ERISA, § 502(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f) (1976).

An action may be brought

in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or
where any defendant may be found. Once proper venue is established, the dis-

trict court may assert personal jurisdiction over every defendant, including, of

course, all plan fiduciaries. ERISA, §502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1976).
299ERISA, §§409(a), 502(a)(2), (3), 29 U.S.C. §§1109(a), 1132(a)(2),

(3) (1976).
21OERISA, § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1976).
211

See text accompanying notes 80 & 81 supra.
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of a defined contribution plan. The participants in such a plan
will immediately feel the sting of an unsuccessful social investment
and, in light of the visibility of their individual accounts, are more
likely to take an interest in the investment policy of the plan. Even
in a defined benefit plan, however, a lawsuit might be prompted by
the prospect that a loss of plan assets in a social investing project
will preclude an increase in benefits at the next amendment to,
or renegotiation of, the plan. In addition, there may be some employees who disagree on ideological grounds with the social-investment policy followed by the plan or who wish to challenge the concept of using plan assets for social purposes. 2 12 Finally, there is
always the possibility that a fiduciary opposed to risking the assets
of the employer to achieve social goals might decide to challenge
a program of social investment in court.
A lawsuit challenging a social-investment program may have
serious consequences for the plan and its fiduciaries. Most fiduciaries are aware that they may be held personally liable in damages
for an investment found by a court to be imprudent. They may
not realize, however, that they may be held liable in damages for
any violation of the other fiduciary standards of the statute.213
Thus, if a loss ensues from a program of social investing which is
not "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries," the
responsible fiduciaries might be required to restore the lost assets
to the plan regardless of the prudence of the investment. 21 4
A lawsuit for damages in the context of a defined benefit plan
presents unique problems. If the plan experiences losses or fails
to reap achievable gains as a result of a socially dictated investment
policy, the plaintiff-participants could force the fiduciaries, including
the representatives of the employer, to restore the lost funds or
212 See, e.g., Sacramento Unions Blast "Social" Concept, PENSIONS & INvEsrsmmNvs, Nov. 5, 1979, at 1.
213 ERISA § 409(a) states:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses
to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of
the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of
such fiduciary.
29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1976).
214 Similarly, a trustee who violated his duty of loyalty under the common law
would be held liable for all losses, regardless of the fairness or prudence of the
investment. See RESTATEmEN (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 206 (1959); 2 SCOTT ON
TRusTs, supra note 34, at § 170.
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profits to the plan. 21 5 Although the employer would in any case
be required to compensate for any deficiency in the investment performance of the plan's portfolio as a result of his obligation under
the funding standards of ERISA, that obligation can be amortized
over a period of many years. 210 A suit for restitution under ERISA,
however, could force the employer to make an immediate lump-sum
payment-a greater burden than the employer may have contemplated.
Although a judicial challenge to a profitable program of social
investing is less likely, even in this situation a lawsuit may have
undesirable consequences for the plan fiduciaries. 217 First, a plaintiff who successfully shows that the program was inconsistent with
the fiduciary standards of the statute would be entitled to an injunction terminating the program. 218 Removal of the responsible
fiduciaries would also be a possibility.2 9 The fiduciaries might be
220
required to pay the attorneys' fees of the successful plaintiff.
Thus, even in a situation in which a socially dictated investment is
unlikely to produce a loss, there are sound practical reasons why
fiduciaries may wish to avoid any deviation from the fiduciary
standards of the statute.
In view of the possibility that a program of social investing
will provoke litigation, any plan embarking on such a program
should construct a solid analytical foundation. The fiduciaries
must first examine the needs and objectives of the plan and may find
See Eaves v. Penn, 587
215 ERISA, § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976).
F.2d 453, 463 (10th Cir. 1978); Freund v. Marshall & TIsley Bank [1979] PEzs.
RaP. (BNA), Oct. 22, 1979 (No. 262), at D-1, D-11 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 24, 1979).
216 See, e.g., ERISA, § 302(b)(2)(B)(iv), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (2)(B) (iv)
(1976) (authorizing the amortization of net experience losses over a period of 15
years for a single employer, and 20 years for a multi-employer plan).
217 Additionally, a violation of the prohibited-transaction rules of ERISA, § 406,
29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1976), may lead to a penalty against the "party in interest"
amounting to five percent of the amount involved in the transaction and up to
100% of that amount if the transaction has not been corrected within 90 days of
notice from the Government. I.R.C. § 4975; ERISA, § 502(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i)
(1976).
218
Pursuant to ERISA § 502(a) (3), a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary may
sue "(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter."
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1976).
See Eaves v. Penn, 426
219 ERISA, § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976).
F. Supp. 830, 838 (W.D. Okla. 1976), aff'd, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
See Eaves v. Penn, 587
220 ERISA, §502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1976).
F.2d 453 (10th Cir.); Mahoney v. Union Leader Retirement Profitsharing Plan,
[1979] PaNs. REP. (BNA), July 16, 1979 (No. 248), at D-4 (D.N.H. July 9, 1979)
(consent order providing for payment of more than $200,000 in attorneys' fees and
expenses); Kulchin v. Spear Box Co., 451 F. Supp. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (awarding $9,041.25 in attorneys' fees).
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it necessary to call on advisors with financial or investment expertise
to develop a rational strategy to meet those needs. Legal advisors
may be consulted on general legal standards, but lawyers should not
be expected to shed much light on primarily factual questions such
as the suitability of particular investments for the portfolio. In
addition, it will usually be more helpful to have the lawyer review
the strategy after it has been developed than to have the lawyer venture from his expertise to describe at the outset what should be
done.
A linchpin in the defense of any investment is a proper rationale for the investment decision at the time it is made.221 The Labor

Department's prudence regulation, in focusing on the reasonableness of the procedures and information used by fiduciaries in making investment decisions, suggests that the Department is developing
a rule based on the fiduciary's conduct at the time of decision
rather than a "hindsight" test based on economic results.22 2 Thus,
prior to undertaking any socially sensitive investment, the plan
should complete an analysis demonstrating the investment's contribution to the achievement of the plan's investment objectives.
Moreover, the fiduciary should develop empirical support for his
view that the investment will advance the retirement interests of
the beneficiaries. In the event of challenge, a social investment
supported by such a contemporaneous rationale is more likely to
be characterized by a court as socially sensitive (and permissible)
than socially dictated (and impermissible).
Some fiduciaries may prefer to avoid such documentation on
the theory that it eases the challenger's proof that social investing
has occurred. Apart from the duplicity of this approach, it seems
naive to suggest that any effective social-investing policy can be
hidden from discovery. On balance, a policy of social investing is
better protected by a documentary foundation, which permits an
effective defense, than by efforts at concealment, which are likely to
provoke the curious to investigate.
This principle does not require a separate, extensive, contemporaneous analysis supporting every decision to include or exclude
an investment. When adequate empirical data is available, it may
be possible to develop more general guidelines that permit the
fiduciary to include or exclude groups of investments. The point is
simply that the evidence supporting such guidelines should be con221See Stark v. United States Trust Co., 445 F. Supp. 670, 680-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); In re Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 89 Misc. 2d 1088, 1090, N.Y.S.2d 781,
784 (Sur. Ct. 1977).
2 22
See 29 C.F.R. §2550.404a-l(b)(1) (1979).
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sidered prior to implementing them and not developed or examined
for the first time when the issue is raised in court.
Of course, not all social investments will lead to litigation.
In the absence of any explicit regulatory guidance or definitive
judicial decisions, it is difficult to state with precision whether a
particular investment policy will be found to violate ERISA. Even
an investment pressing the outer limits of ERISA's fiduciary standards may not be challenged because of the lack of a plaintiff with
a sufficient financial interest to challenge the investment. In light
of these practical considerations, the fiduciary must decide what
degree of comfort he will demand from the law and empirical data
supporting his investment decisions. Although the possibility of
litigation should be considered, in many cases it should be viewed
as simply another risk created by the investment policy.
V.

SUMMARY AND

CONCLUSION

The legal framework established by ERISA is both comprehensive in its coverage of the activities of plan fiduciaries and complex in the restrictions it places on their management or disposition
of plan assets. Thus, any summary of its application to social investing runs the risk of misleading oversimplification. Reduced to
its essence, however, ERISA appears to require that every plan investment be subjected to a three-part analysis.
In the first part, the responsible fiduciary must determine
whether the financial characteristics of the investment will satisfy
the prudence and diversification requirements of the statute. The
fiduciary must evaluate the safety, return, marketability, and diversification characteristics of the proposed investment in order to determine whether, in the context of the plan's entire portfolio, the
investment will aid the plan in achieving its investment objectives.
Those objectives in turn should have been formulated with due
regard for the plan's design, funding, liquidity needs, and other individual characteristics. Thus, the financial needs of the plan will
lead to the establishment of investment objectives designed to meet
those needs. In turn, those objectives can be achieved by adopting
investment strategies which use one or more groups of economically
comparable investments. Although a fiduciary may be able to invoke
a socially sensitive investment policy in order to select among these
alternative investments, a socially dictated investment policy, in
which financial comparability is sacrificed in order to achieve some
social purpose, will not withstand scrutiny under this part of the
statutory analysis.
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In the second part of the analysis, the fiduciary's actions in selecting particular strategies or investments must be reconciled with
the purposes declared permissible by the statute. If there is any
element of self-interest in the choice of investments, whether that
interest is financial or ideological, then the statute may well prohibit such conduct. Even where the fiduciary acts without regard
to his own interests, it is nevertheless essential that the investment
program be designed primarily to further the interests of participants and beneficiaries. If the fiduciary faces a choice between investments with identical financial characteristics, it may be possible
to choose an alternative that offers indirect benefits to plan participants as members of some larger community. But, in light of
the difficulty in proving both a pure motive and financial equivalence, it may be more sensible to develop an investment policy designed to permit only those investments that aid the interests of
the plan participants as participants. Under this criterion, then,
even some socially sensitive investment policies could be rejected as
inconsistent with the objectives of the statute.
Finally, each transaction must be consistent with the structural
standards of ERISA. If the investment will benefit a "party in interest," such as the employer or union, the plan may find it necessary to obtain an exemption from the "prohibited transaction" rules
of the statute. In all events, the investment decision must be made
in accordance with the plan documents.
The application of this analytic approach may be illustrated
by considering two current issues in the social-investing debate.
First, there has been considerable commentary suggesting that a plan
fiduciary will find it easier under the law to exclude certain investments because of their supposed social deficiencies than to affirmatively select other investments because of their perceived social
advantages. The argument is made that: exclusion is more likely
to be permissible because the fiduciary is simply "crossing out one
firm from a universe that has a huge number of options." 223
Although it will be difficult as a practical matter to establish
financial loss when a fiduciary eliminates a limited number of
investments from a large universe of acceptable alternatives, it makes
relatively little difference from a legal perspective whether the fiduciary proceeds by a method of exclusion or inclusion. The critical
questions are: first, whether the investments that the fiduciary is
considering have the financial characteristics to satisfy the plan's
223 Social Investing: A Volatile Issue Surfaces, PENsimOs &
23, 1978, at 24 (quoting Professor Roy A. Schotland).
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investment objectives, and second, whether the fiduciary's criteria
for choosing or eliminating some investments within this acceptable
universe are designed to further the retirement interests of the plan
participants and beneficiaries. The use of a socially sensitive investment policy to guide the affirmative selection of investments is
permissible so long as the investments are prudent and the policy
is designed primarily to further the interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries. On the other hand, the statute appears to
prohibit the exclusion of even a limited number of investments
within the acceptable universe on the basis of self-interested goals
such as benefiting the company or the union.
Of course, the number of investments excluded under the investment policy may be of some relevance in deciding whether that
policy can be harmonized with the prudence and diversification
requirements of the statute. When a socially dictated investment
policy requires the exclusion of an entire category of investments,
it may preclude the fiduciary from achieving one of the plan's investment objectives. For example, one study found that exclusion
from the Standard and Poor's 500 of all companies with business
interests in South Africa would eliminate all major multinational
firms and essentially eliminate many major industries, such as computers, international oils, major chemicals, and automobiles. 224 In
these circumstances, a fiduciary's efforts to achieve appropriate diversification may be stymied. Another recent study of the market performance of the top ninety-nine institutional holdings concluded
that those thirty-nine companies deemed "socially irresponsible" by
the Corporate Data Exchange Study 225 had performed slightly better
over the past five years than the sixty presumably "responsible"
companies. 26 Without exploring the precise significance of these
studies, it can be inferred that a broad exclusion policy may require
the sacrifice of some element of safety or return. On the other
hand, a veto of just a few stocks, such as that reportedly granted to
the union in the Chrysler settlement, is not likely to preclude the
22 7
fiduciary from locating equivalent investment opportunities.
224

See Mares, supra note 10; So. African stock is dumped but no ill effects
yet: Heritage, PENSiONS & IvESTMENTs, Nov. 5, 1979, at 6.
22
5 CopopA.TE DATA EXCHANGE, INC., PENSiON INVESTMENTS: A SocALk AuDrr
(1979). See note 15 supra.
226 Robert A. Levy of Computer Directions Advisors, Inc. found that 39 "bad
guys" had produced an average gain of 83.5% over the past five years (exclusive
of dividends) whereas the 60 other leading holdings had gained only 76.8% in the
Social Investing could hurt fund persame period (exclusive of dividends).
formance: ODA Study, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Nov. 19, 1979, at 35.
227
See note 14 supra.

1980]

INVESTMENT OF PENSION ASSETS

Once the prudence hurdle has been cleared, the policy must
then be squared with the "solely in the interest" standard. As noted
above,22 8 when dealing with a situation in which the benefit to plan
participants is difficult to identify and yet no evidence of selfdealing appears to be involved, courts may well re-examine the
prudence issue and, if satisfied that that standard is satisfied, elect
not to force a "random choice" notion of selection.
A second area of controversy in the social-investing debate in
which the legal framework of ERISA can provide guidance, is the
voting of shares owned by the plan. As noted earlier, 229 the fiduciary standards of ERISA section 404 apply to such activities on
the part of plan fiduciaries. The prudence rule of section
404(a)(1)(B) prohibits the fiduciary from voting the shares in a
way that would jeopardize either the safety or return of the plan's
investments. The "solely in the interest" test of ERISA further
proscribes any attempt by a fiduciary to use voting power to further
the fiduciary's own interests.

28 0

Apart from these constraints, however, the fiduciary probably has relatively broad discretion in voting the plan's shares.
For example, corporate law recognizes that those who control corporations may choose to sacrifice immediate financial gain in the
pursuit of a socially responsible policy that will yield good will
or an improved business environment. 231 As a practical matter, a
plan fiduciary may be able to justify most of his votes on social
issues with the explanation that the socially responsible course of
conduct was in the best interests of the corporation and therefore
protective of the financial health of the retirement fund. It would
be only an extreme case when the use of voting influence could

28 2
jeopardize the financial integrity of the underlying entity.
2 28

See notes 99-147 supra & accompanying text.
See text accompanying note 73 supra.
230 Cf. Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C.), stay denied per
2 29

euriam, 447 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1971), af'd mem., 511 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (trustees violated common-law fiduciary duty of loyalty by maintaining unnecesarily large cash deposits at a bank controlled by the union of which one
trustee was president).
231 E.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 NJ. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal
dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953)

(donation to private university); Union Pacific

Railroad Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958) (donation to
private foundation); Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch. 1969) (payment in
lieu of taxes to local governments). See generally 6A W. FLETCHER, CYcLOPEDIA
OF THE LAw oF PRivATE CoRoRA-IoNs § 2938 (1968); Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REv. 157 (1970).
232 See 125 CoNG. BEc. 5560 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979) (remarks of Sen.
Williams):
Stressing once again that the ERISA fiduciary rules are designed to achieve
a goal of great social importance, the supplying of retirement or deferred
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These examples illustrate the extent to which a fiduciary may
consider social factors in discharging his duties under ERISA. No
support can be found in the statutory standards for the proposition
283
that a fiduciary must adopt a socially sensitive investment policy.
The legislative history of ERISA suggests considerable congressional
antagonism to any such requirement. Moreover, the highly structured allocation of investment responsibilities permitted by the Act,
under which a trustee or investment manager is given only limited
duties and powers with respect to a portion of the plan's portfolio,
constitutes a serious barrier to any effort to vest the investment
manager with responsibility for making social as well as financial
judgments on behalf of all of the plan's participants. Finally, in
light of the complexities inherent in defining social policies in the
interest of participants, in setting priorities among those policies,
and in developing criteria for measuring corporate compliance, it is
difficult to imagine that a court would engraft on the otherwise
mute language of the statute a judicial requirement that plan fiduciaries undertake such an arduous analysis.
If the analysis in this paper produces the sense of a restrictive
legal environment, it is because ERISA and its legislative history
suggest that significant barriers presently exist for fiduciaries who
might use employee-benefit trust assets in order to achieve their
own notions of socially desirable objectives. Although there appears to be some room within the legal framework of the statute
for socially sensitive investment policies intended to promote the
retirement interests of beneficiaries, ERISA appears to proscribe
policies sacrificing financial comparability or promoting the interests of third parties in pursuit of some broader social objective. If
this regulatory framework is found to be unsatisfactory, there may
well be need for appropriate legislative change. Until that time,
however, it ill behooves any fiduciary covered by the Act to embark
on a program of social investing without first carefully analyzing the
limitations contained in ERISA.
income and health and welfare benefits, there is no question in my mind
that those rules permit the exercise of stock voting rights in a way that
is consistent with other social concerns of the plan's participants and
beneficiaries except in the rare case where such action would measurably
impair the security of plan assets or adversely affect the plan's economically
sound investment objectives.
2 33
See Ferguson, Socia Investing: An Advocate's Perspective, in EBPJ, supra
note 15, at 93.

